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11 Introduction
Anyone with a slight acquaintance with Aristotelian philosophy is familiar with such 
locutions  as  ‘x isn’t  F except  homonymously’,  or  ʻF is  said  in  many waysʼ.  When 
saying that two things are homonymously F, Aristotle means that they have their name 
in common but different definitions or accounts of being corresponding to the names. 
The aforementioned idioms are, as I said, easily found throughout the whole corpus, but 
Aristotle is most perspicuously occupied with discussing the phenomena of homonymy 
or multivocity (‘things being said in many ways’) in his logical and dialectical works, in 
contexts devoted to methodological considerations. As he is there keen to point out, it is 
of great importance not to overlook homonymy in the construction of arguments. For by 
letting homonymy slip into one’s premises, one risks drawing unwarranted conclusions. 1 
Likewise, one must be wary not to suppose unity amongst divergent phenomena, and as 
a consequence fail to secure a proper subject matter for one’s enquiry,2 another way of 
ignoring homonymy. It is, however, not only in his destructive or critical moments that 
Aristotle makes use of homonymy. If ‘homonymy’ simply means ‘things with the same 
name, but with different accounts of being’, it seems that multivocals, or ‘things said in 
many ways’, are also reckoned as homonyms by Aristotle. When we now remember that  
‘being’, ‘cause’, ‘good’, ‘nature’ etc. are among the most notorious examples given by 
Aristotle of multivocals, we see that—supposing that we can justify the equivalence of 
homonymy and multivocity—a notion of homonymy is central, and possibly of great 
importance,  in  his  constructive  or  positive  philosophy  as  well.3 His  appeals  to 
multivocity  are accordingly not  restricted to  critical  contexts,  where he for example 
1 In more familiar words, one risks committing fallacies of equivocation. To give  a banal example of a  
such: (i) The end of a thing is its perfection, and (ii) death is the end of life, so (iii) death is the 
perfection of life. ‘End’ is of course equivocal (i.e. homonymous) in premiss (i) and (ii). See chapter 4 
in Sophistici Elenchi for more on fallacies involving homonymy.
2 In Posterior Analytics I 28 Aristotle says with regard to a science that it is one ‘if it is of one genus’ 
(87a38). A genus is something common between its species, and is therefore predicated synonymously 
(that is, non-homonymously) of them. (See also Posterior Analytics I 7, 75b7–8) 
3 In  Metaphysics  Gamma 2 Aristotle accordingly goes beyond the condition for the unity of science 
stated in the cited passage from Posterior Analytics above: ‘For not only in the case of things which 
have one common notion [τῶν καθ’ ἓν λεγομένων] does the investigation belong to one science, but  
also in the case of things which are related to one common nature [τῶν πρὸς μίαν λεγομένων φύσιν];  
for  even  these  in  a  sense  have  one  common  notion’ (1003b12–15).  Both  καθ’ ἓν-predication 
(synonymous predication) and πρὸς ἓν-predication (viz.  non-synonymous predication in which the 
predication  nonetheless  is  systematically  related  to  one  thing/nature/source)  is  here  said  to  be  a 
sufficient condition for a unified science. (Cf. Metaphysics Gamma 2, 1004a23–26) 
2confronts the philosophizing of his predecessors, most notably Plato, but are also very 
much present  in his  own systematic  philosophy. To give but  one example:  Aristotle 
accuses Plato in numerous places of failing to notice the complexity of certain central 
philosophical  concepts,  and the  variety  of  diverse  phenomena and circumstances  of 
which and in which they are applied. This is, in Aristotle’s view, what leads Plato to 
posit a single Form of Goodness, being the same for all good things, and in which they 
participate, according to Platonist orthodoxy, in order to be what they are, namely good 
things. The mistake here, according to Aristotle, is to assume that all good things are 
good in the  same way;  that  the  goodness  is  somehow common across  all  cases.  In 
criticising  Plato  for  ignoring  homonymy,  Aristotle  insists  that  the  kind  of  unity 
advocated by Platonism, in this case of the phenomenon of goodness, does not stand the 
test of thorough philosophical enquiry. Thus an appeal to homonymy, which we in this 
introduction  have  been  assumed  to  be  the  same  as  multivocity,  is  both central  to 
Aristotleʼs handling of what he reckons as a tendency in philosophy to incautiously treat 
subtly complex and intricately related worldly phenomena as unified and uniform, and 
crucial as a powerful conceptual tool in his own constructive philosophical work, when 
he is eager to outdo his colleagues in making sense of worldly things and happenings. 
Aristotle is firmly convinced that the ordered world is capable of being satisfactorily 
accounted for, even though the account will turn out to be more complex than what his 
predecessors could foresee, and he thinks that his concept of homonymy is well suited 
for the task of explaining such an order in multiplicity (to parrot the title of Christopher 
Shields’ influential book on this topic). By showing the ways in which many interesting 
homonyms are associated, he exemplifies an alternative way of explaining the ordered 
world  which  pays  heed  to  the  more  or  less  obvious  complexities  overseen  and 
disregarded by his predecessors.
In the first part of the thesis (chapter 2) I will present Aristotle’s basic conception of 
homonymy, show that it has the broad application assumed for it in this introduction, 
and respond to considerations in support of a different and more narrow understanding 
of homonymy. In doing so I will claim interpretative support from a wide range of texts 
spanning the whole of Aristotleʼs philosophical career, and will thus additionally argue 
that Aristotle holds on to the same conception of homonymy more or less consistently 
throughout  his  whole  life.  After  having  summarized  the  kinds  of  homonymy 
acknowledged by Aristotle (in 2.5), I conclude the first part of the thesis by giving a 
3survey of the different uses Aristotle makes of homonymy in his philosophy (in 2.6). In 
the  second  part  of  the  thesis  (chapter  3)  I  give  a  detailed,  critical  presentation  of 
Christopher  Shields’ causal  analysis  of  core-dependent  homonymy.  Core-dependent 
homonyms are homonyms which are associated, viz. has overlapping definitions, and 
amongst whom one is primary in the sense that the definitions of the other inevitably 
makes  reference  to  it.  When  giving  a  causal  analysis  of  these  homonyms,  Shields 
explains  the  relations  among  the  core  and  non-core  homonyms  in  causal  terms. 
Although his analysis is very promising, its difficulty in accounting for the asymmetry 
in the causal relation between core and non-core instances weakens it considerably. In 
the third part of the thesis (chapter 4) I develop criticisms of Shields’ analysis hinted at 
in the second part, presents a notion of causal priority that might be able to account for 
the  asymmetry  in  the  relations  between  core  and  non-core  homonyms  (4.1),  and 
conclusively confronts Shields’ analysis with an example of core-dependent homonymy 
that  arguably  evades  causal  analysis  (4.2),  thus  threatening  the  generality  of  his 
analysis,  according to  which  standing in  a  causal  relation  to  a  core  homonym is  a  
necessary condition for qualifying as a core-dependent homonym. 
 Many significant  contributions  have  been made to  the  study of  homonymy and 
related  topics  in  Aristotle  during  the  last  sixty  years  or  so,  and the  exposition  that  
follows is indebted to numerous participants in this flourishing branch of Aristotelian 
scholarship.4 Among  the  important  influences,  Christopher  Shields’ recent  work  on 
homonymy has undoubtedly left the strongest mark on this exposition.5 
4 The contributions by Owen (1960), Owens (1951), Hintikka (1973) and Irwin (1981) are especially 
important for this study.
5 Shields (1999)
42 Homonymy: the basic conception
2.1 The definition of homonymy in the Categories
As I have already mentioned, talk of homonymy is to be met with throughout the whole 
of  Aristotleʼs  corpus.  That  being  said,  one  finds  the  most  extensive  treatment  of 
homonymy  in  the  part  of  Aristotleʼs  works  devoted  to  logical  and  methodological 
questions,  the so called  Organon.  Here he explicitly  deals  with  the phenomenon of 
homonymy in the books Topics and Sophistici Elenchi in connection with discussions of 
syllogisms  and  scientific  definitions.  A  typical  situation  in  which  homonymy  is 
mentioned in these works is when he advises us to be cautious not to let homonymy slip 
into the premises so as to produce invalid conclusions in argumentation. Even though 
talk of homonymy frequently crops up in them, a definition of the concept is curiously 
nowhere to be found in these works. The only place where Aristotle actually defines 
homonymy is  in his  early work the  Categories,  where out  of  the blue  and with no 
precaution or any previously given reason,6 homonymy is distinguished from synonymy 
and paronymy at the very beginning of the work. Of these three it is the concepts of 
homonymy  and  synonymy  that  are  of  interest  to  us.7 After  having  made  these 
introductory distinctions, Aristotle proceeds to discuss matters apparently unconnected 
with  the  first  section,  leaving  us  to  ponder  the  significance  of  the  preliminary 
clarifications, and how they might relate to the questions that occupy the rest of the 
work.8 We will discuss further the relation of the introduction to the preceding parts of 
6 This fact has made some philosophers, notably Michael Frede (1983, 1 and 1987, 11), speculate that  
an original introduction to the work, which contextualizes it and tells us what sort of enquiry it is etc.,  
is lost. An example of a longstanding dispute with regard to the Categories (perhaps partly due to its 
lack of a proper introduction) is whether it is a logical or metaphysical work.
7 ‘[Paronyms] are things denominated, with a difference in case-ending, from one of the instances ... 
They are differentiated entirely on grammatical distinctions’ (Owens, 1951). The example Aristotle 
gives of a paronym in Categories is ‘grammarian’ which is denominated from ‘grammar’. Notice that 
both homonyms and synonyms can be paronyms (cf.  Topics  I 15, 106b29–107a2): If a thing is a 
homonym, its paronym will also be a homonym. Example: ‘healthily’ (which is paronymous with 
‘health’).  For a different view on paronyms see Günter Patzig (1960) and Wolfgang-Rainer Mann 
(2000)  who  both  suggest  that  paronyms  occupy  a  conceptual  space  between  homonyms  and 
synonyms, and their understanding of paronyms is thus close to what we will come to call associated 
or systematic homonymy. I will not discuss their views. As far as I can see, they have sparse textual 
support for their view, and besides, there is no room for it—nor need for it—once the special class of 
associated homonyms has been accepted.   
8 In fact, homonymy is not mentioned anywhere else in the  Categories.  Aristotle does however use 
‘multivocity’ once,  at  8b26:  ‘...quality  is  one  of  the  things  that  is  spoken  of  in  many  ways.’ 
‘Synonymy’, on the other hand, crops up three more times in the work, at 3a34, 3b7, and 3b9. 
5the  Categories  later,  but  let  us  now  have  a  look  at  Aristotle’s  claims  regarding 
homonymy  in  the  Categories.  Aristotle  says:  ʻWhen  things  have  only  a  name  in 
common and the account of being [λόγος τῆς οὐσίας] which corresponds to the name is 
different, they are called homonymous … When things have the name in common and 
the  account  of  being  which  corresponds  to  the  name  is  the  same,  they  are  called 
synonymousʼ9 (1a1–2,6–7). The account of synonymy given here is quite simply: ʻx and 
y are synonymously F iff (i) both are F and (ii) the definitions corresponding to “F” in 
“x is  F” and “y is  F” are the same.ʼ The account of homonymy is given in negative 
terms, as lacking one of the conditions of synonymy: ‘x and y are homonymously F iff 
(i) both are F and (ii) the definitions corresponding to F in “x is F” and “y is F” are not 
the same.’ This definition of  homonymy is a bit unsatisfactory however, for it does not 
clearly settle if only things with just the name in common, and nothing more, are to 
qualify as homonymous, or if things having the same name and not exactly the same 
(but in some way related) definition or account of being10 is also included. If one opts 
for the first alternative and holds that homonymy is to be restricted to things with the 
same  name  and  completely  distinct  and  unrelated  definitions  corresponding  to  that 
name, then one will have to admit of a tertium quid between homonymy and synonymy, 
viz.  things  with  related  or  overlapping  definitions.  If  one  instead  opts  for  the  last 
alternative, the distinction between homonymy and synonymy will be  exhaustive,  that 
is: for any thing  x,  x  is either a homonym or a synonym. (Or, if talking about words: 
Every definable term is either a synonym or a homonym.11) For those holding that two 
things are homonymous only if they have their name in common and have completely 
distinct definitions, homonymy aligns with straightforward ambiguity. ‘River 
banks’ and ‘money banks’ are homonymously called banks because the definition of 
‘bank’ in the different cases are wholly distinct. Let this be the  narrow conception of 
homonymy. The homonyms subsumed under this conception are all, owing to the fact 
that their definitions are distinct and unrelated,  discrete homonyms. But consider the 
more  troubling  case  of  ‘healthy’ as  we  encounter  it  in  contexts  such  as:  ‘healthy 
complexion’,  ‘healthy  lifestyle’ and ‘healthy  banana’.  The  definition of  ‘healthy’ in 
9 Slightly modified Oxford translation. Unless otherwise indicated the translations given throughout the 
text are from The Revised Oxford Translation (Barnes 1984).
10 I use ‘account of being’ and ‘definition’ interchangeably since a definition is an account of being for a 
given thing.
11 I will follow Aristotle in speaking of both things and words as ‘homonymous’ and ‘synonymous’. 
More on the domain of homonymy and synonymy and the justification for sliding between a lexical 
and ontical domain in our talk of homonymy and synonymy follow shortly in 2.1.2.
6these cases is arguably different (‘indicative of health’, ‘productive of health’ etc.), so 
that it fails to qualify as synonymous across these cases. The different definitions of 
‘healthy’ in these cases are none the less still related somehow, since they all appeal to 
health. Is it then a homonym, or does it fall between homonymy and synonymy, making 
up a third class of things or terms? Let us call the conception of homonymy which also 
subsumes these cases the broad conception of homonymy. Based on the relatedness of 
their  respective definitions,  we will  call  ‘healthy’ and similar  homonyms  associated 
homonyms. The  broad  conception  of  homonymy encompasses—there  should  be  no 
doubt about that—both discrete and associated homonyms.12 
If we restrict our attention to the Categories in our attempt to reveal Aristotleʼs view 
on the nature of homonymy, we will very likely end up confused and frustrated. The 
example that Aristotle gives right after having stated his definition, is that both a man 
and  a  picture  is  a  ζῷον,  a  name  that  in  Greek  denotes  both  animal  and  picture. 
Immediately  this  seems  to  support  the  narrow  conception  of  homonymy  since  the 
definitions of man and picture, the accounts of their being, are completely distinct. If, 
by contrast, ζῷον is meant to signify ʻpicture of an animalʼ—something it often does in 
Greek, and which makes Aristotleʼs example here unnecessarily confusing—, then it is 
not so obvious anymore that this is the only possibility. For an account of the being of a 
picture  of  an animal  will  somehow refer  to  the  account  of  the  being of  an animal, 
ʻsomething with a perceptual soulʼ, for something will count as a picture of an animal 
only insofar as it succeeds to a certain degree to represent a thing with a perceptual soul, 
and the definition of a picture of an animal will then have to include the definition of an 
animal  (something which clearly constitutes a definitional  overlap). If  we think that 
ζῷον means ʻpicture of an animalʼ in the first paragraph of  Categories, we thus have 
reason  to  believe  that  Aristotle  opts  for  the  broad  conception  of  homonymy.  But 
because, as I have noted, ζῷον is ambiguous in Greek between ‘animal’, ‘picture of an 
animal’ and ‘picture’13,  we are  not  in  a  position  to  say if  Aristotle  is  giving us  an 
example  that  demands  the  broad  conception  or  not.  But  even  if  Aristotle  really  is 
12 The two technical  expressions ‘discrete homonymy’ and ‘associated homonymy’ are both adopted 
from  Shields  (1999).  ‘Associated  homonymy’ has  in  the  literature  also  been  labelled  ‘related 
homonymy’ (Ward, 2008), ‘systematic homonymy’ (Ward, 2008; Frede/Patzig 1988, vol. II, 72) and 
‘connected  homonymy’  (Irwin,  1981).  Even  though  I  will  occasionally  use  these  other 
characterizations  as  well,  ‘associated  homonymy’  is  my  preferred  technical  choice.  ‘Discrete 
homonymy’ is preferred over ‘accidental homonymy’ (Ward, 2008; Frede/Patzig, vol. II, 72: ‘zufällige 
Homonymie’, as I will reserve this to a subclass of discrete homonyms), ‘unconnected homonymy’  
(Irwin, 1981), ‘unrelated homonymy’, and ‘distinct homonymy’.  
13 An example of a use of ζῷον to simple mean picture is given by Herodotus (4.88): ‘to have pictures of 
the bridging of the Bosporus painted [ζῷα γράψασθαι τὴν ζεῦξιν τοῦ Βοσπόρου]’ (Liddell & Scott, 
1968).
7alluding  to  the  complete  distinctness  of  the  definitions  of  ʻmanʼ  and  ʻpictureʼ  in 
illustrating his conception of homonymy, it is not yet excluded that he, in addition to 
such homonyms with absolutely distinct definitions (the boringly obvious ones) also 
admits of ones with related, i.e. overlapping, definitions, and that the broad conception 
is his account of homonymy even though he does not give an example that definitively 
settles this. 
When remembering that Aristotle in Metaphysics Gamma 2 states that ‘being is said 
in many ways [τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς], but in relation to one thing [πρὸς ἓν] and one 
kind  of  nature,  and  not  homonymously’,  (1003a33–34,  my  own  translation)  and 
immediately draws the comparison with ‘healthy’ and ‘medical’, one is perhaps tempted 
to regard this as prima facie evidence for the view that there have to exist multivocals 
(‘things said in many ways’) holding a position as a  tertium quid between homonymy 
and synonymy. I will argue that this is too hasty a conclusion, and by invoking broader 
textual evidence try to show that Aristotle actually holds that the distinction between 
homonymy and synonymy is exhaustive (and thus that ‘being’, ‘healthy’ and ‘medical’ 
are homonyms, although, as we shall see, not so-called accidental homonyms14), and 
consequently that ‘homonymy’ and ‘multivocity’ are extensionally equivalent. 
2.2 Excursus: the domain of homonymy
It is perhaps surprising that I numerous times in the preceding paragraph have talked of 
things as being homonymous or synonymous. But this  is wholly in accordance with 
Aristotle’s  own  practice.  Nowadays  it  is  usual  only  to  talk  about  words  as  being 
synonymous, and then what is meant is that different words signify the same thing, or in 
the  vocabulary  that  we have  used  so  far:  have  the  same definition.  Today  we call 
14 Their most important property as homonyms is actually non-discreteness, where discreteness consists 
in the absence of definitional overlap. It is perhaps surprising that  accidentality  and  discreteness  in 
some instances go apart, but this is really the case. For example, as we shall see, an amputated leg and  
a ‘living’ leg are homonymously called legs, non-accidentally but discretely. It is no accident (i.e. it is 
by no happenstance of language) that an amputated leg is called a leg. Its visual resemblance with a 
real leg and its former occupation as a real leg explain this linguistic convention perfectly well. But 
being committed to a thesis of functional determination of kinds, Aristotle holds that the definition of 
the amputated leg—having lost its function as a leg—is completely distinct from the definition of leg, 
so  that  an  amputated  leg  is  discretely  homonymously  a  leg.  Even  though  there  are  some  non-
accidental  discrete homonyms,  all accidental homonyms are discrete homonyms. For more on the 
special case of non-accidental discrete homonymy see  2.1.4    
8‘homonymous’  words  with  different  meanings  but  identical  spelling.15 It  is  thus 
important to appreciate that Aristotle is primarily talking about things as homonymous 
or  synonymous,  even  though  he  holds  that  these  characterizations  also  pertain  to 
words16, but then secondarily and on the basis of the nature of the things. In the cited 
passage from Categories  this is obvious, as it is clearly not terminological definitions 
that are in question, but differences among the accounts of being for the different things 
with  a  common name.  Aristotle  is  after  real  definition as  opposed  to  mere  lexical  
definition.  Real definition  amounts to essence specification. So when Aristotle claims 
that it is the nature of the things that grounds the homonymy (ambiguity) or synonymy 
of terms, he is committed to holding that what terms signify are extralinguistic things, 
namely  real  essences.17 This  has  dramatic  consequences  for  Aristotleʼs  view  on 
language possession. In his view one has to have a good share of empirical knowledge 
to be recognized as a fully competent speaker: One has to fully grasp the application 
conditions for the terms in one’s language, something which amounts to knowing the 
essences of the things referred to by the words one employs. To know the essence that is 
15 Some  translators  have  chosen  to  translate  ‘homonymy’  and  ‘synonymy’  into  ‘equivocal’  and 
‘univocal’ respectively, in order to avoid confusion with the contemporary use of the terms. Although I 
don’t  see  any  problem  with  such  a  translation,  I  have  chosen  to  stick  with  ‘homonymy’ and 
‘synonymy’, both because they are appropriations into English of the Greek terms used by Aristotle, 
and because I think the introduction of these terms in the context of this study leaves no doubt about 
their technical meaning.      
16 One place where this is evident is in De Generatione et Corruptione I 6, 322b29–32. As we shall see 
below, words are also explicitly treated as homonyms in Topics. 
17 Essence is typically understood just to belong to substances and to be that which makes them be what  
they are. So one would perhaps wish to object at this point that only names of substances could signify 
essences and that only real definitions of substantial kinds could specify essences, whereas I seem to 
claim more generally that even property terms signify essences, something which could not possibly 
be  the  case  since  they  denote  non-substance  categorial  beings,  which,  as  we  know,  don‘t  have 
essences.  Again,  as  it  is  said,  only  substances  have  essences.  It  is  surely  true  that  essences  are 
primarily and without qualification (ἁπλῶς) ascribed to substances, but Aristotle admits essences to 
qualities,  quantities  and  other  non-substance  categories  too,  but  then  secondarily:  ‘[E]ssence  will 
belong, just as the “what” does, primarily and in the simple sense [ἁπλῶς] to substance, and in a 
secondary way to the other categories also,—not essence simply, but the essence of a quality or of a 
quantity’ (Metaphysics  Z.  4,  1030a29–32).  The  essences  of  non-substance  categorial  beings  will 
somehow depend on the essence of a substance, and this is the reason why the ascription of essences  
to them are qualified, as it is said in Aristotelian terms. The kind of dependency between primary and 
secondary  essences  are  completely  analogous to  the  dependency between primary  and  secondary 
kinds of beings (i.e. between substances and non-substance categorial beings), and there is a perfectly 
good reason for this, one which unfortunately is obscured in translation. A more accurate translation of  
Aristotle’s technical  expression for ‘essence’ (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) would namely be ‘the what it is [for 
something] to be’ (or actually: ‘the what it was to be’, but where the imperfect ‘ἦν/was’ is used in  
order to designate the defining characteristic, the way of being that continuously characterized [this is 
the aspect brought forth by the imperfect tense]  and characterizes still the thing in question with 
regard to itself [viz. the kind of being it is]. This particular use of the imperfect is sometimes classified  
as ‘philosophical imperfect’. See Frede/Patzig 1988, vol. 2, 35). As we thus see, we find in Greek a  
very close conceptual tie between being and essence: Essence is understood in terms of being. So 
Aristotle’s claim that essence is said in many ways simply follows from his famous commitment to the 
multivocity of being.  
9signified by a certain term, and thus to be a fully competent user of that term, can be 
described  as  having  grasped  the  specific  term’s  deep  meaning. To  not  be  fully 
competent in the use of a word, and thus be liable for example to confuse a homonym 
with a synonym (because of a failure to grasp the different accounts of being underlying 
the names), we can coin having grasped a term’s surface meaning.18 Aristotle will need 
this distinction in order not to deem Plato, for example, an utterly incompetent speaker 
of  Greek (a  most  unfortunate  thing...),  and  in  order  to  explain  why some cases  of 
homonymy are difficult  to detect.  The different  layers of significance introduced by 
Aristotle  correspond  to  his  more  familiar  distinction  between  levels  (or  stages)  of 
knowledge frequently appealed to in methodological contexts.19 The same object can be 
known more or less thoroughly, and it is the task of the researcher to aim at the most 
scientific of definitions for the object of study. For Aristotle this will be a definition that 
appeals  to  principles  and  causes,  things  more  knowable  in  themselves  and through 
which other things are known. This is the kind of definition that is ‘more knowable in 
nature’.  The  scientific  path  towards  such  definitions  yet  unavoidably  starts  from 
preliminary  accounts  of  the  ‘everyday  understanding’ of  the  objects  at  issue,  what 
Aristotle  calls  ἒνδοξα,  ‘reputable  opinions’.20 Things  are  revealed  in  the  reputable 
opinions,  but  not  completely  and  fully.  The  definitions  of  things  inherent  in  the 
reputable opinions are mostly correct, but they do not exhaustively explain the things 
they  are  supposed  to  account  for,  and  for  this  reason  they  do  not  hold  ‘without 
qualification’ (ἁπλῶς). There is more to be said of things than what is contained in the 
preliminary accounts and initial definitions of the ‘common understanding’, but this is 
not necessarily to claim that the common understanding gets things wrong, it is just to 
say that it is insufficient and incomplete.21 For even when the common understanding 
18 For more on Aristotle on signification see chapter 3 in Shields (1999) and the chapters 4–6 in Charles 
(2000). 
19 This distinction is reflected in his famous methodological mantra: ‘[We must] start from the things 
which are more knowable and clear to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and more 
knowable by nature’ (Physics 184a16–18, cf. Physics 188b32, 189a5, Nicomachean Ethics 1095b2–4, 
1098b3–8, Topics 141b4, 141b25, De Anima 413a11–16, Posterior Analytics 71b9–16, 71b32–72a)
20 Cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1145b2–7, where this scientific route, that takes departure from the reputable 
opinions about things in the way they normally present themselves, is clearly recommended. 
21 Another way of putting this could be to say that to be able to state the ‘scientific definition’ of some  
term and thus being regarded as having grasped the deep meaning of that term coincides with being 
acquainted  with  the  essence  signified  by  the  term  under  some  sort  of  privileged  guise/mode  of 
presentation (and that we should understand the locution ‘more knowable in nature’ along these lines). 
When one has grasped the surface meaning of a term, on the other hand, one is only acquainted with 
the essence signified by the term under some other, less privileged, guise/mode of presentation. 
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plainly gets things wrong, it is almost always in an interesting way that nevertheless 
reveals something about the thing investigated. 
To sum up our little detour: The connection between the depth of knowledge about 
an  object  and  the  understanding  of  the  word  that  denotes  that  object  can  now be 
expressed in this way: Holding ‘reputable opinions’ about a thing suffices for grasping 
the surface meaning of the term denoting that thing, whereas a deeper understanding 
and a more scientific account of the thing is needed in order to grasp the deep meaning 
of the word.22 23     
2.3 Narrow or broad conception? The evidence from the 
Topics and beyond 
When inspecting texts beyond  Categories for evidence that might settle our question, 
we find that Aristotle in some places introduces homonyms that are compatible with the 
narrow conception of homonymy, but that he in other places clearly requires the broader 
conception. Since the broader conception includes the cases of homonyms without any 
definitional overlap, viz. the homonyms captured by the narrow conception, as special 
cases, the broad conception of homonymy seems to be Aristotle’s only viable option. 
22 To see what a detailed realist interpretation of Aristotle’s view on signification would look like, as  
well as explorations of the connection between signification and scientific practice in Aristotle, see 
Charles (2000), Irwin (1982) and chapter 3 in Shields (1999).   
23 The very brief treatment of Aristotle’s view on signification in this paragraph has in numerous ways 
involved simplification. One implication of what I have said here seems to be that only those names 
that signify, viz. are conventionally related to (to bring out a further aspect of Aristotle’s view on  
signification that have been left aside), essences, have meanings. But this is not so. Aristotle admits 
meaning to some terms which are not related to essences (viz. that lack references), but in these cases 
the names/terms in question must either  (i)  be compounds of other  terms which on their  part  do 
signify essences (for example ‘goatstag’ and ‘gold mountain’), or (ii) be correlated with a complex  
thought whose contents are essences (under some mode of presentation). I have avoided the more  
laborious story of how words relate to the world via thoughts. Statements of the form ‘x signifies y’ 
(where x is a word and y is an essence) should be read as an abbreviation of ‘x signifies y by being a 
symbol  of  a  thought  (‘affection  of  the  soul’)  which  is  a  likening  (ὁμοιώματα)  of  y’.  (Cf.  De 
interpretatione, 16a3–8) A further investigation into these dimensions of signification would have to 
address the interesting statement on Aristotle’s part to the effect that it is the ‘forms’ of the objects of 
thought ‘without their matter’ which is present as the contents of thought. (Cf. De Anima, 429a13–17. 
See also 424a17–24 where the analogical case of perception is described.) Since forms and essences 
are the same for Aristotle (cf. Metaphysics Z, 1032b1: ‘By form I mean the essence of each thing’), 
his  account  of  thinking  interestingly illuminates  his  view on signification,  viz.  that  terms  signify 
essences.  
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Let us now have a look at some of these texts. 
In  Topics I.  15,  Aristotle  introduces different  techniques  for  determining whether 
something is spoken of in many ways or in only one (πολλαχῶς ἢ μοναχῶς  τῷ εἴδει 
λέγεται, 106a9). In the  context of this work the detection of homonymy or multivocity 
(the  terms  are  here  used  interchangeably!)  has  primarily  a  negative  function  as 
establishing  lack  a  of  synonymy or  univocity.  The  concern  of  Topics is  to  give  an 
account of dialectical practice, or more precisely an account of how to reason skilfully, 
and homonymy is  thus  first  and foremost  treated as  a  possible  source of  fallacious 
reasoning  (e.g.  when  homonymy  has  slipped  into  the  premises  of  an  argument 
unbeknownst to the disputant). It is notable that many of the tests for homonymy are 
explicitly linguistic. In the first test (106a10–22) Aristotle encourages us to see if the 
opposite of something is spoken of in many ways, and whether the divergence is in form 
or in word. For,  as he points out,  in some cases the differences emerge even in the 
words. In the case of sound, the opposite of sharp (ὀξύς) is flat (βαρύς), while in the 
case of bodies the opposite of sharp is blunt (ἀμβλύς). So, clearly, the opposite of sharp 
is spoken of in many ways. But, he proceeds, if this is so, then sharp too is spoken of in  
many ways, for the same sharp will not be the opposite of both flat  and blunt. In a 
similar  way,  the  opposite  of  fine  (καλός)  in  the  case  of  animal  is  ugly  (αἰσχρός),  
whereas the opposite of fine in the case of a household is wretched (μοχθηρός), so that 
fine is homonymous. A variant of this test is to see if a term has an opposite in some 
uses but not in others (106a35). If this is the case the term in question is a homonym. 
(The emotion love does for example have hate as its opposite, whereas physical love 
lacks an opposite altogether.) In other cases linguistic tests do not suffice to establish 
homonymy, that is, it  is not obvious from a difference in names that the opposite is 
spoken of in many ways. We say both with respect to light and to students that the 
opposite of bright is dim, but the bright light is luminous, whereas the bright student is  
intelligent. In this case there is ‘no divergence in names, but the difference in form is 
immediately  quite  obvious’ (106a23–25).  Another  test  Aristotle  invokes  to  detect 
homonymy is to see if two things sharing a name belong to different genera (which are 
not  sub-  or  superordinate  to  one  another).  Since  no  two things  can have  the  same 
account of being when falling under different genera,24 a demonstration of membership 
in different genera will suffice to establish that two things are homonymous. Another 
non-linguistic test for homonymy that is advocated in  Topics I. 15 is a test based on 
sense perception. Things belonging to the same sensible kind are perceived by the same 
24 Obviously, since definitions are given by genus and specific difference.
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sense. Since bright colours are perceived by the special sense sight, and bright sounds 
are perceived by the special sense hearing, being bright is not the same for colours and 
sounds,  and  ‘brightness’  is  predicated  homonymously  of  these  various  sensations 
(106a29–32). I will not go through all the numerous tests for detecting homonymy or 
how many ways something is said that Aristotle presents in this  chapter, but a brief 
mentioning  of  a  few  more  representative  ones  will  hopefully,  in  addition  to  those 
already  sketched,  suffice  to  give  a  good  outlook  on  the  characteristics  of  the 
homonymy-detecting strategies invoked by Aristotle. The first two that I will examine is 
a test of the possibility of comparison (107b13–18) and a test for the existence of an 
intermediate  (106b4–8).  Synonymous things  are  comparable,  so the  impossibility  of 
comparison indicates non-synonymy. Both a sword and a sarcasm can be sharp, but it is 
impossible for a sword to be sharper then a sarcasm. ‘Sharp’ is thus non-synonymously 
applied on swords and sarcasms. The test of the existence of an intermediate, on the 
other hand, asks of us to see if a word pair that has an intermediate in some uses lacks 
an  intermediate  (or  has  a  different  one)  in  other  uses.  If  so,  the  word  pair  under 
consideration is applied non-synonymously across these cases. The example Aristotle 
gives does not translate well into English (something which is symptomatic for many of 
the linguistic tests),25 but  since I haven't  been able to dream up a better  one,  I  will 
present  his.  ‘Bright’  (λευκός)  and  ‘dark’  (μέλας)26 have  ‘grey’  (φαιός)  as  their 
intermediate when they are said of colours, but lack an intermediate altogether when 
they are said of sounds, if one is not willing to accept ‘muffled’ (σομφός), that is. This 
shows that ‘bright’ and ‘dark’ are homonymous. The fact that ‘bright’ and ‘dark’ in the 
case of colours have numerous intermediates, namely all the other colours,27 whereas 
they at most have one (‘muffled’) with regard to sound, also indicates that ‘bright’ and 
‘dark’ are used homonymously. (106b4–13) 
In addition to the above treated things (or terms) that have revealed themselves as 
homonymous through the tests in  Topics  I. 15, i.e. sharp, fine, love, bright and dark, 
Aristotle enumerates several others amongst which we find pleasure, seeing, perceiving, 
just, health, good, balanced, and colour. In our aim to delineate the borders of Aristotle’s 
25 Some of the tests do not translate at all, and mostly when this is the case, or when a satisfactory  
translation is hard to facilitate, the tests just detect pure accidents of language, what we hitherto have  
called accidental homonyms.  
26 ‘White’ and ‘black’ are the best translations into English of λευκός and μέλας when colours are the 
subject, but in order to make Aristotle’s example work, I have her chosen ‘bright’ and ‘dark’. 
27 This is probably something that most people today are not willing to accept, and thus depends on a 
Greek (or at least Aristotelian) theory of colour, in which all the colours are understood to belong in a  
spectrum between black and white. 
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conception  of  homonymy,  we  do  wisely  also  to  look  at  some  of  these  alleged 
homonyms more closely. Whereas many of the homonyms mentioned above are clearly 
so-called accidental homonyms without anything definitional in common (examples of 
which are: sharp, bright and dark), and thus are compatible with the narrow conception 
of  homonymy,  others  are  obviously  definitionally  related  and  demand  the  broader 
conception.  Let  us  consider  two  of  them,  ‘seeing’ and  ‘healthy’.  We will  consider 
‘seeing’ first. Aristotle says that when the contradictory, i.e. the negation, of a term is 
used in many ways, the term itself must also be used in many ways. ‘Not seeing’ (τὸ μὴ  
βλέπειν,106b15) is both used of the situation in which people lack the capacity to see 
entirely and the situation in which people fail to exercise the capacity to see. Therefore, 
when reporting that a person doesn’t see one can either mean that the person in question 
is blind or that he, for some reason or other (tiredness, distraction,  blindfoldedness, 
etc.), fails to actively exercise his capacity to see. The homonymy of ‘seeing’ (and of 
course the other inflections of the term) is not so easily appreciated as that for ‘not 
seeing’ simply because ‘seeing’ does not have such widespread intransitive use as ‘not 
seeing’. The ambiguity of ‘seeing’ is in a way concealed by the fact that the term most 
of the time has an object (e.g. ‘see the bullfight’, ‘see the bridge’). We are in any case 
easily  brought  to  acknowledge  the  different  sayings  of  ‘seeing’  through  the 
demonstration of the different sayings of ‘not seeing’. With regard to the homonymy of 
‘not seeing’ (and consequently ‘seeing’), in contrast to the likes of ‘sharp’ and ‘bright’, 
it is clearly not the case that the instances are definitionally unrelated, or that the states 
denoted by the word ‘seeing’ have wholly different accounts of being: The capacity of 
sight is present in the account of being for both kinds of seeing. —The first way to see 
is constituted by the having of the capacity sight, whereas the second way is constituted 
by the exercising of that capacity. The state of actually employing or exercising one’s 
sight seems here to be accounted for or made sense of on the basis of the notion of  
capacity. On the other hand, capacities are generally accounted for with reference to 
activities in the work of Aristotle. He holds that capacities (or in more familiar technical 
jargon: potentialities/potencies) in some way or other are definitionally and in being 
what  they are dependent  on activities (or actualities)  (προτέρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ 
λόγῳ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ; ‘actuality is prior both in formula and in substance’ Metaphysics,  
1049b11.  Cf.  De Anima  415a18–20).28 The  capacity  of  sight  is  defined  through an 
activity: seeing-at-work. Whether or not it is the case that ultimate reference is made to 
28 For the present purpose I treat ‘capacity’, ‘potency’ and ‘potentiality’ as equally good translations of 
δύναμις, and both ‘activity’ and ‘actuality’ as valid translations of both ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια. 
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the capacity of sight or the activity of seeing in the accounts of the different ways of 
seeing, the definitions are incontestably closely connected. 
Let us now move on to the other homonym that I announced we should have a closer 
look at, and that likewise has related or overlapping definitions in its different sayings, 
namely ‘healthy’. One of the places in which ‘healthy’ is introduced as an example of 
homonymy in the now familiar chapter from the Topics is after a warning that ‘[o]ften in 
the actual accounts as well homonymy creeps in without being noticed’ (107b6–7), and 
that we therefore ought to inspect the accounts as well. If someone for example should 
claim that both what is indicative and productive of health has balance with respect to 
health,  one  should  not  rest  with  this  explanation,  but  instead  inquire  in  what  way 
balance is said in the different cases. If balance in the first case is meant to characterise 
a state of such a kind as to be liable to produce health, whereas balance in the second is 
a state indicative of the presence of health, then balance is homonymous in the different 
accounts  and  thus  makes  the  things  (or  words)  to  which  the  accounts  are  given 
themselves  homonymous.  This  test  is  not  the  only  one  involving  ‘healthy’ in  the 
chapter, and it is interesting to see how close Aristotle’s explanation—or at least the 
outline  of  one—of  the  homonymy  of  ‘healthy’  here  is  to  his  far  more  famous 
demonstration of the multivocity of ‘healthy’ in the philosophically weightier context of 
Metaphysics  Gamma 2.  In  our  chapter  in  Topics he  states  that  things  that  produce, 
preserve and indicate health all are healthy (106b35–36), and the reason for this seems 
to be (though not explicitly enunciated) that all these different states stand in some kind 
of relation to health itself, viz. a state (of proper functioning) potentially present in an 
organism. In Metaphysics Gamma 2 the different healthy things are so called because of 
their relation to one thing (πρὸς ἓν, 1003a33) and one source (μίαν ἀρχήν, 1003b6): 
health. —A diet is healthy insofar as it preserves health; an hour at the gym is healthy  
insofar as it produces health; a nice tan is healthy insofar as it is an indication of health;  
and a natural  organic body is  healthy insofar as it  is  capable of receiving health.  If 
health is to be characterized as a state of perfect functioning for an organism, it seems 
that it  is organisms such as trees, animals and humans that are healthy in a primary 
sense, whereas all other things are healthy just in case they stand in the right sort of 
relation  to  this  state  of  health  in  the  organism.  The  claim  of  both  Topics  and 
Metaphysics is that healthy is said in many different ways and of different objects, but 
since the accounts of being for each and every one of the healthy things make reference 
to health (one thing and one source), the accounts overlap—they are not completely 
distinct  and  unrelated—and  thus  ‘healthy’,  if  it  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  homonym 
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(something it clearly is in Topics), needs the broad conception of homonymy. 
Despite the interchangeable use of multivocity and homonymy, and the enumeration 
of homonyms with overlapping definitions together with homonyms which are so-called 
discrete  without  anything  definitional  in  common,  that  all  of  which  point  in  the 
direction  of  the  broad  conception,  the  recent  evocation  of  the  notorious  place  in 
Metaphysics  Gamma 2, can nevertheless immediately make us doubt this conclusion 
with its ‘said in many ways … and not homonymously’. What are we to make of this? 
In  Nicomachean  Ethics,  when  discussing  the  ways  in  which  the  good  is  said, 
Aristotle asks: ‘[I]n what way are things called good? They do not seem to be like the  
things  that  are  homonymous by chance  [ἀπὸ τύχης  ὁμωνύμοις]’29(1096b26–27). By 
saying ‘homonymous by chance’ Aristotle seems to imply that there are also such things 
as non-chance, i.e non-accidental, homonyms, and that the good things are candidates 
for being such. What is otherwise the point in making such a qualification? If Aristotle 
then  acknowledges  the  existence  of  homonyms  that  have  something  definitional  in 
common in addition to the accidental homonyms—things that just happen to have the 
same name without anything definitional in common—could it be that what he really 
wants  to  do  in  Gamma  2  is  to  contrast  the  multivocity  of  ‘being’,  ‘medical’ and 
‘healthy’ with accidental homonymy and not homonymy as such, and that he should—if 
he were to express his view with maximal expositionary clarity—have made it clear that 
it  is  just  the  accidental homonyms  that  are  to  be  contrasted  with  the  πρὸς  ἓν-
multivocals? I believe that is the case. In the seventh book of Eudemian Ethics we find a 
very  similar  statement  regarding  homonyms which  also  seem to  imply  that  not  all 
homonyms are unrelated and have the same name merely by chance. The subject under 
investigation is friendship, and in the course of the exploration of this phenomenon, we 
are told that there are three kinds of such. But, Aristotle proceeds, even though there are 
different kinds of friendship, they are, just as is the case with the medical, not ‘wholly 
homonymous’ (πάμπαν ὁμωνυμῶς, 1236a17). The reason for why they are all correctly 
called friendships—and here follows a now familiar sort of explanation—is that they 
are all related to one that is primary (or is itself the primary). The expression that is used 
here, ‘wholly homonymous’, does not only seem to imply a recognition of homonyms 
that are in some way related in addition to the accidental ones, but also that the degree 
of closeness and relatedness among homonyms vary. This is something that is explicitly 
29 Slightly modified Oxford translation.
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admitted in Nicomachean Ethics V. 1, where different instances of justice and injustice 
are said to be so closely (σύνεγγυς) homonymous that it often escapes notice. (1129a26–
28) The talk of some homonyms being close, indeed so close that their homonymous 
character  escapes  us,  is  very significant  for  our  project  of  delineating  the  scope of 
Aristotle’s conception of homonymy. This kind of talk would be altogether inexplicable 
if Aristotle only regarded discrete homonyms as homonyms. For how can homonyms 
without  anything definitional  in  common be  close  to  each other?  Besides,  it  seems 
implausible  that  different  cases  of  justice  should  have  no  definitional  overlap.  In 
Physics VII. 4 Aristotle elaborates his view on the varying degrees of relatedness among 
homonyms:  ‘[S]ome homonymies  are  far  removed  from one  another,  some  have  a 
certain likeness, and some are nearly related either generically or analogically, with the 
result that they seem not to be homonymies though they really are.’30 (249a23–25) Only 
the broad conception of homonymy can reasonably be seen to handle all the various 
kinds of homonymy described in this passage. That some homonyms can be hard to 
distinguish and thus are easy to overlook is something we have seen Aristotle point out 
earlier,  e.g. in his  treatment of ‘healthy’ in  Topics. And there are even more similar 
places in the corpus. In chapter 7 of Sophistici Elenchi Aristotle gives ‘one’, ‘being’ and 
‘sameness’ as examples of homonyms that are difficult to distinguish (169a22–25), and 
in chapter 33 in the same work he writes: 
[J]ust as in fallacies that depend on homonymy, which seem to be the silliest form 
of fallacy,  some are  clear even to the man in the street  (for humorous phrases  
30 What  exactly  is  meant  by  Aristotle  when  he  says  that  homonyms  can  be  nearly  related  either 
generically or analogically is of course a very interesting question, but a question that I nevertheless  
will have to steer clear of for the time being. I will only use the citation to support the claim that  
Aristotle holds that homonyms can be both closely related and clearly distinct. What I perhaps ought 
to  do in  connection  with this  excerpt  from  Physics,  however,  is  to  make a warning.  By the use 
‘analogically’ in  the  excerpt  some  readers  are  perhaps  inclined  to  think  of  the  understanding  of 
analogy in medieval philosophy, and ask themselves if what I have called associated homonymy is not 
really analogy and why the discussion so far has not treated this concept. Medieval philosophers under  
the  influence  of  Aristotle,  notably  Thomas  Aquinas,  in  fact  used  analogy,  or  more  specifically 
analogia attributiones,  for what I have called associated homonymy or πρὸς ἓν-multivocity.  Even 
though the medieval concept of analogy stems from πρὸς ἓν-multivocity in Aristotle’s philosophy, no 
textual support can be given to the assumption that analogical and πρὸς ἓν-multivocal predication are  
the same for Aristotle. What ‘analogy’ consistently signifies in Aristotle is what is called  analogia 
proportionalitatis  in  medieval  philosophy:  ‘For  proportion  (ἀναλογία)  is  equality  of  ratios,  and 
involves four terms at least […] e.g. as the term A, then, is to B, so will C be to D.’ (Nicomachean 
Ethics 1131a31–b6, with omission) So, one should not, regardless of what traditionally has been done, 
use ‘analogy’ for associated homonymy. For more on the relation between Aristotle  and medieval 
philosophy  see  chapter  4  ‘Analogy  in  Aristotle’,  in  Rocca  (2004).  Regarding  the  shift  in  the 
conception  of  analogy  Rocca  writes:  ‘According  to  Pannenberg,  Avveros  was  the  first  to  make 
analogy a mean between univocity and pure equivocity, identifying analogia in its older meaning of 
proportio with the Aristotelian pros hen equivocal, which entails a term’s being predicated per prius 
et posterius by means of a relation of dependence.’ (Rocca 2004, 90–91)    
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nearly all depend on diction [...]), while others appear to elude the most expert. 
(182b13–22)
From  the  examples  and  citations  above  we  see  that  Aristotle’s  attitude  towards 
homonymy  remains  remarkably  consistent  from  early  works  such  as  Topics  and 
Sophistici Elenchi to later ones such as Physics and Nicomachean Ethics. In all of them 
Aristotle  is  eager  to  warn us  against  overlooking  hard-to-detect  homonyms,  and he 
clearly separates them from the accidental ones, those out of which jokes are made and 
which are obvious to just about anyone. This is impossible to reconcile with Aristotle 
holding that the class of homonyms exclusively consists of discrete homonyms. If this 
were the case it would make no sense for Aristotle to warn against overlooking some 
homonyms.  As we can see from his discussions of among others the homonymy of 
‘healthy’ and ‘seeing’ from Topics, Aristotle acknowledges multivocals/homonyms with 
overlapping definitions in his early philosophy, and his explanation for the homonymy 
of ‘healthy’—that the different healthy things are  so called because of their  various 
relations  to  health  itself—is,  even though it  lacks  a  bit  in  precision  and specificity 
compared to the account in Gamma 2, at least basically the same. The explanation in 
Topics could be regarded as the skeleton of the fleshed out explanation of πρὸς ἓν-
multivocity in Aristotle’s later philosophy, of which Metaphysics Gamma 2 provides an 
example. And just as nothing distinguishes homonymy and multivocity in  Topics,  we 
should likewise recognize that no separation of homonymy and multivocity is intended 
in  Metaphysics  either,  and that  the  πρὸς  ἓν-multivocals consequently  are  subsumed 
under  homonymy also  here  (as  associated  homonymy,  that  is).  Aristotle’s  recurring 
insistence throughout all his philosophy—both in the mature philosophy of Physics and 
Nicomachean Ethics,  and in the early philosophy of Topics and Sophistici Elenchi—of 
the closeness of some homonyms, and the difficulty involved in detecting them in such 
cases,  is another indication that  there is  no shift in Aristotle’s general  conception of 
homonymy from his early to his late works. He consistently accepted both accidental 
and related homonymy, and thus held the distinction between synonymy and homonymy 
to be exhaustive—perhaps contrary to what the troubling sentence from Gamma 2 leads 
us to believe. Accordingly, we can safely assign to Aristotle the broad conception of 
homonymy at any time in his philosophical career. 
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2.4 The special case of non-accidental discrete homonymy
From the bulk of excerpts hitherto explored in which Aristotle treats homonymy, one 
can get the impression that all discrete homonyms are obvious and easy to recognize, 
and that only the associated homoynyms are philosophically interesting. The kind of 
examples that Aristotle uses to illustrate discrete homonymy (that equal such English 
words as ‘crane’, ‘key’, ‘organ’ and ‘bank’) contributes to this. They are obvious and 
accidental ones; ‘the sort out of which jokes are made’.31 This is unfortunate, for there 
are actually some discrete homonyms that are still non-accidental. Some things without 
anything definitional in common have nevertheless non-accidentally (viz. by no mere 
coincidence of language) the same name. As with associated homonyms, the homonymy 
in these cases is difficult to detect. We find two of the most famous examples of such 
non-accidental  discrete homonymy in the first chapter of book II in  De Anima.  One 
involves an artefact, and the other a body part. Aristotle has at the relevant stage in the 
chapter just given a general account of his hylomorphism, and proceeds with comparing 
an  ensouled  body  (a  paradigmatic  instance  of  a  hylomorphic  compound)  with  a 
functioning axe: 
We have now given a general answer to the question, What is soul? It is substance  
in the sense which corresponds to the account of a thing. That means that it is what 
it is to be (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) for a body of the character just assigned [i.e. natural  
organized body]. Suppose that a tool, e.g. an axe, were a natural body, then being 
an axe would have been its essence (οὐσία), and so its soul; if this disappeared 
from it, it would have ceased to be an axe, except in name (ἀλλ’ ἢ ὁμωνύμως). 
(412b10–15)
What Aristotle argues here is that if an axe should lose that which makes it an axe, let’s 
call it its axe-ity, and is for this reason no longer able to do whatever it is that axes do, it  
is not an axe any more. This can happen in various ways. An axe can lose its ability to 
31 Here are some examples of English jokes which exploit the discrete homonymy of ‘clubs’, ‘practise’  
and ‘institution’ respectively: ‘Do you believe in clubs for young people? Only when kindness fails’ 
(W. C. Fields); ‘Does your uncle still practise dentistry? No, he finished practising. He does it for a  
living  now’ Unknown origin);  ‘Marriage  is  a  wonderful  institution,  but  who wants  to  live  in  an 
institution?’ (Groucho Marx, in Animal Crackers)  
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function as an axe both for reasons external to its structure (e.g. if it is meticulously 
hidden away or if  the  practice of  chopping wood becomes extinct)  and for reasons 
internal to its structure (e.g. because of massive corrosion of the metal in the axe-head 
or disintegration of the handle). If then the internal constitution of an axe decays to the 
extent that the axe can no longer be used as an axe (but also, I presume, if a certain form 
of human practice collapses, since the function [ἒργον] of a tool seems to depend on 
some specific human activities), it is not an axe anymore, except homonymously (ἀλλ’ ἢ  
ὁμωνύμως). For, the account of being for an axe that is only homonymously an axe will 
not make appeal to what it is to be an axe, since to be an axe proper is to be an artefact 
that is suitable for chopping. 
One  could  perhaps  be  inclined  to  believe  that  an  axe  and  a  former  axe  would 
somehow be related,  and that  the account  of an axe that is  unsuitable  for chopping 
would have to make reference to the account of what it is to be an axe. But this is not  
Aristotle’s  view.  Based  on  the  conviction  that  essences  of  things  are  functionally 
determined, he holds that an object that cannot fulfil the function of an axe (i.e. cannot 
chop) does not really qualify as an axe at all.32 But, even so, Aristotle admits that it can 
be conversationally legitimate, or at least excusable, to call a more or less dissolved axe
—say a specimen from the middle ages on display in a museum—an axe, even though it 
does not have the essence of axe-ity and is thus not strictly speaking an axe anymore. 
That a wrecked axe is an axe only homonymously and not strictly is at any rate not as  
obvious as the case of a  blood-pumping organ and the organ of Notre Dame being 
homonymously organs. It is not by a mere accident of language that the different axes 
share the same name, although, on the assumption that the axe in the museum is no 
longer functional, the account of the museum piece is totally distinct from the account 
of  a  functioning  axe.  ‘Axe’ is  then  a  non-accidental  but  discrete  homonym.  In  the 
similar example immediately following the one involving the axe, Aristotle applies his 
hylomorphism to a part of a living body, the eye:
 Next, apply this doctrine in the case of the parts of the living body. Suppose that 
the eye were an animal—sight would have been its soul, for sight is the substance 
of the eye which corresponds to the account (οὐσία ὀφθαλμοῦ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον), 
the eye being merely the matter of seeing; when seeing is removed the eye is no 
32 The firmness of the assertion with regard to this case does of course interestingly address the question:  
What kind of a relation is necessary and sufficient for associated homonymy, since this one clearly is 
not? We will have to let this question rest for now, but will take it up again in part 2.2, where the 
grounds for the association of some homonyms are more thoroughly explored. 
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longer an eye, except in name (πλὴν ὁμωνύμως)—no more than the eye of a statue 
or of a painted figure. (412b18–22)
Aristotle’s point here is that an eye incapable of seeing does not have the account of 
being of an eye. An eye bereft  of sight is  not an eye, except homonymously (πλὴν 
ὁμωνύμως). But, just like the case with the broken axe in the former example, Aristotle 
grants that for practical reasons one can continue to call an eye without sight an eye 
even though it strictly speaking isn’t an eye. Because it lacks the essence of an eye, 
namely sight, and thus is incapable of doing what it is that an eye does, that is to see, the  
sightless  eye  is  not  really  an  eye.  But  again,  similar  to  the  situation  with  the 
malfunctioning axe,  that  a  blind  eye  and  a  properly  functioning  eye  are  eyes  only 
homonymously is not something that is obvious to just about anyone, and Aristotle does 
not pretend that it is so either. As he often does when confronting a case of non-obvious 
homonymy, Aristotle compares the difficult-to-detect case with an obvious case, hoping 
to move us to acknowledge the first on the basis of the highlighted similarities with the 
second. With unwavering certainty he declares that an eye without sight is no more an 
eye than a sculpted or painted eye, for the account of being for an eye has no more 
application to it than to these other two.33 The functioning eye and the blind eye have 
nothing definitional in common, but they are not as clearly homonymous as keys and 
organs, and it is not a mere happenstance of language that they share the same name. 
The two different eyes are non-accidentally but discretely homonymous. 
We have seen Aristotle claim that bodies and body parts bereft of their functions are 
not bodies or body parts any longer, except homonymously, that is: in name only. One is 
nonetheless (for some yet unarticulated reason) permitted—at least in some contexts—
to call them by these names. The name does not really apply to them though, for they 
are not instances of the kind denoted by those expressions. Aristotle obviously thinks 
that  it  is  worthwhile  to  stress  that  detached  fingers  and  dead  bodies  are  only 
homonymously fingers and bodies, but what philosophical mistakes can follow from 
overlooking  them?  And  what  is  Aristotle’s  argument  in  favour  of  the  claim  that  a 
detached finger is a finger only in name? 
33 Aristotle aligns dead bodies and detached bodily parts with painted and sculpted bodies and body-
parts  in numerous other  places as well.  See  Meteorologica  389b25–390a13;  Politics  1253a19–25; 
Parts of Animals 640b30–641a6; Generation of Animals 734b25–27. The locutions ‘x isn’t F, except 
homonymously’ (πλὴν ὁμωνύμως)  and  ‘x  isn’t  F,  but  rather  homonymously’ (ἀλλ’ ἢ  ὁμωνύμως) 
appear in abundance in these places.  
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Aristotle’s argument for the existence of homonyms of the above described kind—non-
accidental  discrete homonyms—involves a thesis of central  importance to him about 
kind individuation, namely that kinds are functionally determined. As we shall see, it is 
as  a  consequence  of  this  thesis  that  Aristotle  is  bound to  consider  non-functioning 
specimens of a kind to be mere homonyms, and not genuine instances of the kind in 
question.  Let us examine more closely this thesis and its implications for Aristotle’s 
view on homonymy.
 All the non-accidental discrete homonyms presented above are such that they at one 
time are genuine Fs and at another time are bogus Fs. They cease to be genuine Fs but 
continue to retain the outward form or appearance of genuine Fs.34 In these cases we can 
see that it is not by a mere happenstance of language that the different things are called 
F even though their accounts are discrete. It is because we are so accustomed to calling 
a thing with a certain look an F, that we continue to do so even when it is no longer a 
genuine F. Perhaps we do not even know that it is not a genuine F. The threat of making 
mistakes in philosophical contexts thanks to a failure to distinguish genuine from bogus 
instances of a kind seems to be Aristotle’s motivation for stressing the homonymy in 
these cases. Mistakes involving a confusion of a non-accidental homonym may not be 
as  grave  as  mistakes  based  on  a  confusion  of  an  associated  homonym,  and  the 
philosophical  consequences  may  not  be  as  severe,  but  they  will  nevertheless  be 
mistakes.  So,  what  grounds  Aristotle’s  distinction  between  genuine  Fs  and 
homonymous  Fs?  As  I  have  already  said,  Aristotle  holds  a  thesis  of  functional 
determination for kind membership and individuation, and it is simply as a consequence 
of this that he must regard detached fingers and dead bodies as bogus instances of the 
kinds finger and body respectively. We find a formulation of this thesis in Politics I. 15. 
Here Aristotle refers to his view about the  homonymy of non-functioning body parts in 
a discussion of the priority of the polis over the family and the individual, and clarifies 
it by placing it within a general account of kind individuation: 
Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since 
the whole  is  of  necessity  prior  to the part;  for  example,  if  the whole  body be 
destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except homonymously, as we might speak 
of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. But things 
34 ‘Outward  form or  appearance’ should  be  understood  as  what  Aristotle  sometimes calls  σχῆμα in 
contrast with μορφή or εἶδος. (Cf. Physics, 193b7–12.)
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are  defined  by  their  function  and  power  (πάντα  δὲ  τῷ  ἔργῳ  ὥρισται  καὶ  τῇ 
δυνάμει); and we ought not to say that they are the same when they no longer have 
their proper quality, but only that they are homonymous. (Politics, 1253a19–25) 
The claim here is that things that are just homonymously F (in the way we are interested 
in  here:  non-accidentally  and discretely)  are such because  they lack the function or 
power associated with being an  F.  To recirculate an old example: an axe that is  no 
longer suitable for chopping, and has thus lost its  function, is not really an axe any 
more. The function of an object is identified with the ‘proper quality’ of an object, the 
quality that makes it the object it is. In the case of the finger, its function or proper 
quality will be something like contributing to the functionality of the hand. This would 
in turn be specified, I suppose, as a capacity to perform certain kinds of operations 
(handing, giving, shaking, sending etc.) in the interest of the organism to which it is a 
part. But the specific functions for the particular kinds of objects, viz. what individuates 
the particular  objects,  shall  not occupy our attention.  More important  is  the general 
account of kind individuation. Regarding it we should notice its scope and strength. It 
says that all things are defined by their function, and that a thing will be defined as an F 
just in case it has the function and power of a genuine F:
Functional determination (FD): An individual x will belong to a kind or class F 
iff: x can perform the function of that kind or class.35 
The thesis states that having a function definitive of being F is both a sufficient (‘if  x 
can perform the function definitive of being an F, then x is an F’) and necessary (‘if x 
cannot perform the function definitive of being an F, then x is not an F’) condition for 
being a member of the kind F. 
FD seems at  least  to  perfectly  state  the individuating  conditions  for  all  kinds  of 
artefacts. Take a bed for example. What is it that makes a bed the artefact that it is? The 
obvious answer is that it can perform the function of bed, namely that it is suitable to 
sleep in. Likewise for bread knives, chairs, lights and footballs. What makes these the 
artefacts they are seems to be that they can fulfil specific functions, which in their cases 
35 This formulation of the thesis is taken from Shields (1999), page 33.
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are that they can be used for definitive purposes: to cut bread, to be suitable to sit on, to  
illuminate, and be applicable in the game of football respectively. What they are made 
of  and  how  they  look  does  not  matter.  As  long  as  they  can  perform  the  function 
associated with a certain kind of artefact, they are rightly reckoned as a true instance of 
that kind of artefact. Different chairs have hugely different outward appearances and are 
composed out of remarkably different stuffs (e.g. plastic, mahogany, titanium), but what 
unites them all into one kind is that they are all suitable to sit in. That they can fulfil this 
function is  sufficient for them to fall under the kind chair.  That it is  necessary for the 
objects to fulfil a specific function in order to be a certain type of artefact also seems 
right. A paper installation that has the perfect appearance of a chair, but that will break 
apart as soon as someone tries to sit in it, will not qualify as a chair. Neither will a rotten 
armchair disintegrating under the weight of an unlucky man aiming for rest. The same is  
true for a  rubber  knife or a  broken lamp.  If  they are not able to fulfil  the function 
associated with the respective artefacts, they do not  really count as instances of them, 
and are only called chairs, knives and lights either because they have the outward look 
of these kinds of artefacts or because they previously were in a state compatible with 
performing the relevant functions. It may even be that a broken yet reparable specimen 
of some artefact will (homonymously) be called by the name of the artefact as much 
because it can easily be brought back into functioning again as because it previously 
fulfilled  the  function  associated  with  the  specific  kind of  artefact.  The fact  that  we 
would judge a hotel receptionist who says that a room furnished with a broken lamp and 
the remnants of a chair ‘certainly contains a light and a chair’ to speak falsely, or at least 
very  misleadingly,  also  seems  to  indicate  that  the  necessary  condition  for  kind 
membership  expressed  in  FD  is  befitting  for  artefacts.  In  the  light  of  the  above 
clarifications, Aristotle’s view that artefacts only count as such when they fulfil specific 
functions certainly has a ring of plausibility to it. 
One might respond to this by saying that it is certainly no surprise that artefacts, that 
after  all  are  manmade  and  meticulously  designed  for  some  definitive  purpose,  are 
functionally determined, but that FD is much more dubious as a thesis concerning for 
example  natural  kinds.  Aristotle’s  thesis  has  to  encompass  these  as  well  since  it  is 
explicitly supposed to hold for all things. A modern essentialist who identifies water 
with  H2O  will  not  automatically  count  as  water  everything  that  exhibits  the 
macroscopic  properties  of  water,  or  even to  a  deep level  of  analysis  can  fulfil  the 
functions associated with water. When the modern essentialist thinks of water as H2O, 
he  thinks  of  it  as  compositional  rather  than  functional  stuff,  and  it  can  seem that 
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Aristotelian essentialism, in which essence is identified with function, does not neatly 
fit essentialism grounded upon compositional stuff.36 But this is because one imagines 
that different kinds of compositional stuff can instantiate the same functional kind, for 
example that H2O and some other compositional kind, say XYZ37, both can perform the 
functions  we normally  associate  with  water,  that  is,  that  they can both  be  floating, 
drinkable, freezable etc. If we regard water as a functional kind, then we will in this 
case have two compositional kinds instantiating one functional kind. We have seen that 
Aristotle holds that artefacts, ποιούμενα, the paradigmatic instances of functional kinds, 
can be composed of vastly different compositional stuff. But he does not need to hold 
that the same is true for natural kinds, the φύσει ὂντα.38 He does not need to believe it 
metaphysically  possible  that  something  to  a  deep  level  of  analysis  can  fulfil  the 
functions normally associated with water without being water. If Aristotle rejects this 
possibility,  he can counter  the  modern essentialists  by saying that all  compositional 
kinds  are  also  functional  kinds,  and consequently  that  all  kinds  can be  regarded as 
functional kinds. Compositional kinds will in this perspective be the hyletic foundation 
or material correlate to some specific functional kind.39 But like matter in form-matter 
compounds generally, the ‘compositional kind’ is both explanatorily and ontologically 
posterior  to  the  functional  kind.  To  put  it  in  Aristotelian  terms:  It  is  because  the 
substance in question is water that it is composed of H2O, and not the other way around 
(viz. ‘it is water because it is composed of H2O’). But anyway, even if this outlined 
Aristotelian response to the modern essentialists should prove futile and the existence of 
different  compositional  kinds  that  are  functionally  indiscernible  were  demonstrated, 
Aristotle  would  have  shown  strikingly  little  interest  in  them.  For  him  essence  is 
36 Modern essentialists will charge Aristotle for failing to acknowledge the difference between functional  
kinds  and  functional  specifications  of  kinds  which  either  are,  or  are  not,  functional  kinds.  The 
essences of functional kinds are exhausted by their functions, whereas this does not hold for essences 
of compositional kinds. Chlorophyll can be functionally specified as the substance that makes leaves  
green. But, they will claim, we should not on this ground treat chlorophyll as a functional kind.
37 I am of course here alluding to Hilary Putnam’s famous Twin Earth thought experiment (Putnam 
1973) that boosted the revival of essentialism in contemporary metaphysics.
38 An indication that he in fact does not, can be found in  Metaphysics  Z, 11: ‘[T]he form of man is 
always found in flesh and bones and parts of this kind’ (1036b3–4). A claim to the extent that the 
forms of natural  things  cannot be realized in different kinds of material,  viz.  that  they  cannot  be 
39 Cf.  De Anima, 403a29–b5: ‘Hence a physicist would define an affection of soul differently from a 
dialectician; the latter would define e.g. anger as the appetite for returning pain for pain, or something 
like that, while the former would define it as a boiling of the blood or warm substance surrounding the 
heart. The one assigns the material conditions, the other the form or account; for what he states is the 
account of the fact, though for its actual existence there must be embodiment of it in a material such as  
is described by the other. Thus the essence of a house is assigned in such an account as “a shelter  
against destruction by wind, rain, and heat”; the physicist would describe it as “stones, bricks, and  
timbers”; but there is a third possible description which would say that it was that form in that material 
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inevitably functionally determined, and an answer to a ‘what is it’-question that just 
involves a material description would for him be wholly unsatisfactory, and would not 
make us understand what kind of object we have at hand. Even though H2O and XYZ 
ex hypothesi are distinct compositional kinds, Aristotle will nevertheless, on the ground 
of their functional indiscernabililty, treat them as the same kind with the same essence. 
In Aristotle, function always trumps composition in kind determination.  
But, let’s get back on track. FD, which Aristotle claims holds for both artefacts and 
(perhaps more problematically) natural kinds, requires that we treat Fs whose accounts 
differ from the accounts of genuine Fs as bogus or non-genuine exemplars of the kind in 
question. In contexts in which nothing deeply philosophical is at stake, or one for some 
other reason does not demand absolute precision in talk and conduct, one is nonetheless 
permitted to call some part of stone sculptures and some chopped off bodily parts by the 
name  ‘hand’ because  of  their  distinctive  outward  look,  even though  they  either  no 
longer satisfy the criteria for membership in the relevant kind, or should happen to be a 
mere representation of some object of the kind. In these cases Aristotle would say that 
the instances are only homonymously Fs, and what he thereby implies is that they fail to 
qualify as genuine Fs. They fail to qualify as genuine Fs because they cannot perform 
the functions associated with being an F. In less slack circumstances on the other hand, 
for example in a discussion of what  it  is that  constitutes the life  of some particular 
organism, and where precision and strictness is wanted, we should not allow ourselves 
such loose talk. Some examples involving non-functioning bodies and detached bodily 
parts  nicely illustrates  how the homonymous character of some things only become 
‘visible’ in philosophical or other highly theoretical contexts, whereas they are totally 
overlooked in everyday contexts. Take the homonymy of ‘body’. To insist that a corpse 
lifted  out  of  a  river  is  really  not  a  body  would  probably  be  reckoned  as  both 
disrespectful and tasteless, towards both the dead person himself and his next of kin. It 
is proper to refer to the corpse as a body in this case, and to do something else would 
seem out of place and as a token of insensitivity, if not bestiality. Consider another case,  
a paralysed person. Wouldn’t it  be a terrible insult  to say that he has no legs? And, 
disregarding the potential insult, is it really the case that he has no legs? Is this what  
Aristotle want us to believe? In all these described cases it is perfectly natural, and in 
fact proper, to use the names ‘body’ and ‘leg’ even though the objects referred to do not 
really qualify as such. That they don’t really qualify as such, however, is something that 
eludes most people in most everyday contexts. In fact, that the things in question are 
merely homonymously bodies and legs and that they should not in a strict sense be 
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regarded as such is only evident from within a more scientific approach to the relevant 
things than the normal everyday involvement with them. Only when one inquires what 
it is for a body to be a body or what it is for a leg to be a leg will one come to realize 
that a dead body or a paralysed leg are only homonymously a body and a leg. For being 
a body, according to Aristotle, essentially involves having life potentially in it, and a 
corpse does certainly not have life potentially in it.40 Regarding what it is for a leg to be 
to what it is, Aristotle’s view is that to be a leg essentially involves contributing to the 
functionality of a living organism, something a paralysed leg all too obviously does not. 
Someone who thinks it implausible or even ridiculous that a leg should not be a leg 
anymore just because it is chopped off or a bit floppy, will most likely try to account for 
the inclusion of the object under the kind leg in terms of composition: A leg is a material 
thing composed of muscles, bones, tendons etc., structured in such and such a way. But 
this  account  involves  a  mentioning  of  structure,  and  how should  we  evaluate  in  a 
particular case whether the structural requirements for kind inclusion is met? The most 
obvious  candidate  would  be  to  allude  to  functions,  but  then  a  strict  compositional 
40 That is, an  organic body does essentially have life potentially in it. Aristotle’s distinction between 
organic and non-organic bodies makes it possible for him to account for the death of an organism as a 
change that  some object  undergoes.  It  is  important  to  appreciate  that  it  is  not  the  organism,  for  
example a human body,  qua  organism that undergoes the change. Rather  something changes from 
being a organic body to being a non-organic body, and this cannot be described as a change from 
being for example a finger to being a dead finger. This is because the finger is not preserved through 
the change; the change is not something that happens to the finger: when the finger loses its function, 
its part in the life of the organism, it is no longer a finger; it  is a non-organic body part with the  
outward look of a finger. In the light of the distinction between organic and non-organic bodies and 
body parts, we can now make a little clarification with regard to the status of corpses. It is not strictly 
true that they are not bodies, for they are non-organic bodies. But they are in any case not  human 
bodies (since they are not organic bodies). This specification does not alter the validity of the above 
described scenarios,  since what the foes of an application of FD on natural kinds would insist  is  
precisely this,  that  the corpses are human bodies.  We have here seen that  Aristotle holds that  the  
organic body, the matter for the soul in the hylomorphic compound man, changes into a non-organic 
body when the  soul,  the  source  of  life  and  change  for  the  hylomorphic  compound,  is  somehow 
destroyed. In the case of substantial generation, the situation is analogous. The matter out of which  the 
hylomorphic compound man is generated, is not an organic body. It is only an organic body from the 
moment it is ensouled. In other words, the proximate matter does not persist through the substantial  
generation of a man. It is some other matter—which is potentially proximate matter—that underlies  
the generation and out of which the ensouled body is realized. (The proximate matter is realized at the 
moment of the beginning of the activity of the soul.) (Cf. De Generatione et Corruptione I 4, 319b23–
24.)  To further  complicate  matters,  it  should be noted  that  because some non-organic  bodies  are 
potentially organic bodies, they are in one sense natural bodies having life potentially in them. But we 
must in this case be careful to distinguish the way these bodies are potentially alive from the way 
natural organic bodies are potentially alive, for ‘potentially’ is used homonymously—it is said in two 
ways—with  regard  to  the  these  bodies.  The  potentiality  ascribed  to  the  natural  organic  body 
corresponds to the potentiality involved in the possession of a capacity to speak a certain language, 
whereas the potentiality ascribed to the non-organic body corresponds to the potentiality involved in a 
capacity to acquire the ability to speak a certain language. (Cf. De Anima II 412b25–26: ‘We must not 
understand by that which is potentially capable of living what has lost the soul it had, but only what  
still retains it.’ Right after this statement, seeds (σπέρμα) and fruits (καρπὸς) are given as examples of 
things which are potentially alive in the other sense, viz. as non-ensouled/non-organic bodies, which  
are  potentially  organic  bodies  because  they  can  develop  into  an  organic  body.  Aristotle  would 
probably also hold that transplantable hearts and livers are potentially organic body parts in the same 
way as seeds and fruits are potential organic bodies.)          
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analysis would have failed: one would have fallen back on FD, and contrary to what one  
hoped to demonstrate, the paralysed leg will not be a leg, except homonymously. An 
alternative way to proceed in the quest for a compositional analysis of kinds of body 
parts could be to take a more reductive approach: to be a leg is to be composed of such 
and such chemical elements etc., and to hope that chemical elements can be proven not 
to be functional kinds. 
We have seen that FD seems fitting as an account of kind individuation for artefacts. 
In the case of natural kinds it is more contested. If one includes compositional kinds not 
exhausted by their  functions (and which thus resist  ultimate analysis  into functional 
kinds) in one’s ontology, FD is not universally valid in the domain of natural kinds.41 
But for Aristotle, FD states the conditions for kind individuation for any kind, artificial 
as well as natural. We have seen that what determines kind membership for Aristotle is 
fulfilment  of the function associated with the specific kinds. Anything that does not 
fulfil  the  relevant  function will  not  belong to the kind in question.  In some special 
circumstances  it  is  nevertheless  acceptable  to  call  objects  by some kind-name even 
though  they  are  not  really  members  of  the  kind  in  question.  This  mostly  happens 
because the things exhibit some visible similarities with the genuine exemplars of the 
relevant kind. The similarity, for its part, is typically due either to the fact that the non-
genuine  objects—the  objects  failing  to  fulfil  some relevant  function—actually  were 
genuine functioning objects in the very recent past, or that they were made by some 
artist to resemble an object of the functional kind. 
The account of being belonging to these objects has nothing definitional in common 
with  the objects that belong to the kind with whom they share their name—their per se 
definition or account of being would actually most likely resemble that of a pile of dust
—so they are homonymous in a  discrete way. But since they are called by the kind-
name  because  of  some  likeness  of  their  outer  appearance  with  that  of  genuine 
41 I have used ‘natural kinds’ very broadly to cover anything that is not an artefact (i.e.  man-made).  
‘Natural  kinds’ thus  denote  the  same  as  ‘natural  things’ (τὰ  φυσικά or  φύσει  ὂντα) in  Aristotle. 
Consequently elementary particles, chemical elements and botanical as well as animal species are all 
considered natural kinds. FD is probably more easily accepted for botanical and animal species than 
for  chemical  elements and  especially  elementary  particles.  I  am tempted  to  assume a completely 
universal application of FD on Aristotle’s behalf, but can unfortunately not leap into a discussion of 
this  intriguing  matter  here.  The  relativity  of  proximate  matter  to  form  would  then  have  to  be 
discussed,  as  well  as  extremely  difficult  questions  regarding  prime  matter  and  the  relationship 
between prime and proximate matter. Prime matter—if such there might be—constitutes no kind (at 
least if one demands that kinds must be specifiable, viz. that it must be possible to state what they are), 
and FD has of course therefore no application to it. What in any case remains certain is that Aristotle  
at least believes that FD in the domain of natural kinds holds for botanical and animal species.
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functioning  objects,  it  is  not  accidental  that  they  are  called  by  the  same  name. 
Consequently, they are non-accidental discrete homonyms. 
So  much,  maybe  too  much,  for  the  non-accidental  discrete  homonyms.  The 
meticulous presentation of this special kind of homonymy has in any case provided us 
with the opportunity to present some doctrinal fundamentals of Aristotelian philosophy
—such as his functional criteria for kind individuation—that will prove useful at later 
stages  of this investigation.  Hopefully,  a deeper  general  understanding of Aristotle’s 
concept of homonymy has also been acquired as a result of our dwelling on this special 
kind  of  homonymy.  Of  things  with  general  importance  for  our  investigation  of 
homonymy, we have for example seen that function and essence always coincide for 
Aristotle, in such a way that no synonymous things can have different functions, and for 
anything with different functions, they will have different essences. All homonymous 
things have thus different essences and different functions. 
2.5 The various kinds of homonymy: an overview 
By inspecting a wide selection of texts from his corpus we have seen that Aristotle holds 
what we have coined the broad conception of homonymy throughout the whole span of 
his philosophical work. Aristotle identifies different types of homonyms, but they are 
always  contrasted  with  synonyms  in  a  manner  that  indicates  that  he  regards  the 
distinction into homonyms and synonyms to be exhaustive. What has been referred to as 
the  narrow  conception  of  homonymy  would  only  accept  some  of  the  homonyms 
acknowledged by the broad conception, and relegate the others to a third class of things 
which are neither homonyms nor synonyms. Synonymous things are things which share 
both names and accounts of being. In contrast, homonymous things—according to the 
broad conception of homonymy—share names,  but have different accounts of being 
corresponding  to  the  names.  In  some  places  in  his  writings,  notably  in  his  late 
philosophy, Aristotle seems to admit  instances of multivocals—‘things said in many 
ways’—which are neither synonyms or homonyms, and which thus appear to oppose 
both the broad conception and his earlier habit of treating multivocals and homonyms as 
co-extensive. We saw, however, from some passages in the  Nicomachean Ethics  and 
Physics, that  this  contrast  is  best  understood  as  a  contrast  between  accidental  and 
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associated homonyms and that it consequently poses no threat to the broad conception, 
and likewise constitutes no real break with his earlier practice of treating homonyms 
and  multivocals  as  co-extensive.  The  different  types  of  homonyms  recognized  by 
Aristotle can be divided into (i) those that do not have anything definitional in common, 
the  discrete homonyms, and (ii) those whose definitions are in some way related, the 
associated homonyms. Most of the discrete homonyms are accidental homonyms, and 
what this means is that it is merely by some coincidence of language that the things in  
question share name. The homonymy of things which are accidentally homonymous is 
mostly  easy  to  detect,  and  this  kind  of  homonymy  therefore  poses  no  threat  in 
argumentation.  Because  of  their  obviousness  and  blatant  unconnectedness  they  are 
conducive  to  comical  exploitation  in  jokes.42 ‘Bank’,  ‘key’,  ‘crane’ and  ‘club’ are 
examples  of  this  kind  of  homonyms.  They  are  without  exception  philosophically 
uninteresting.  Some  of  the  discrete  homonyms,  however,  do  not  share  their  name 
accidentally,  are  not  obvious  in  everyday  contexts,  and  consequently  merit  more 
philosophical  attention.  These  are  things  which,  in  Aristotele’s  words,  are  mere 
homonyms because they fail to satisfy certain criteria for being genuine exemplars of a 
kind, more specifically: they fail to fulfil the functions associated with being a specific 
kind of object, and are thus not a real instance of that kind of object. One is nevertheless 
permitted (in some contexts) to call these non-genuine objects by the name of the kind 
they don’t strictly belong to because of some similarity of appearance or because they 
previously satisfied the conditions for membership in that kind. Some examples given 
by Aristotle  of  this  kind  of  homonymous  things  are  detached  body parts  and dead 
bodies. —A detached finger is only homonymously a finger; and a dead body is only 
homonymously a body. Because they are deprived of the functions of the relevant kinds 
of objects, they are not genuinely and in a strict sense a finger and a body anymore.
Unlike the discrete homonyms, all associated homonyms are of philosophical interest 
(qua  homonyms).  The  associated  homonyms  are  homonyms  whose  definitions  are 
overlapping, though not completely (which would have made them synonyms). All the 
associated homonyms are difficult to detect, they are typically disputed, and their status 
as homonyms will thus almost in every case need to be argued for.43 The association of 
homonyms  are  almost  exclusively  accounted  for  in  terms  of  core-dependency  by 
42 See footnote 31.
43 Aristotle possibly regards the homonymy of ‘healthy’ and ‘medical’ as clear and obvious since he 
often resorts to them in illustrating more disputable candidates for homonymy. But the healthy and the 
medical are nevertheless not as clearly homonymous as the accidental discrete homonyms.  
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Aristotle. What Aristotle means when he says that some homonyms are core-dependent 
is that the relevant homonyms associate around a core. Take for example all the healthy 
things.  They are,  according  to  Aristotle,  homonymously  healthy  because  they  have 
different accounts of being corresponding to their name. To put it differently, there are 
different ways of being healthy for the different healthy things. But the different healthy 
things, or the different ways of being healthy, are nonetheless associated, for there is one 
primary or focal44 thing that is healthy to which all the other healthy things must stand 
in the right sort of relation in order for themselves to be healthy. The accounts of being 
for all the non-core instances of healthiness must make reference to the account of being 
for  the  core  instance.  And  the  core  instance  of  being  healthy  is  a  state  of  well-
functioning for an organism. Consequently the account  of what it  is  for an apple,  a 
mountain hike or a skin colour to be healthy must make reference to the health of an 
organism. Since the accounts of being for the non-core instances of healthiness make 
reference to the account of being for health in the organism (or what amounts to the 
same: the definition of a healthy organism is contained in the definitions of all other 
healthy things), the core instance has definitional priority over the non-core instances. 
Even though Aristotle almost everywhere explains associated homonymy in terms of 
core-dependence,  there  seems  to  be  logical  space  for  associated  homonyms  whose 
association  is  not  explained  in  this  way.45 Since  Aristotle  leaves  the  possibility  of 
associated  homonymy that  is  not  core-dependent  unexplored,  associated  homonymy 
will in the following—if not otherwise noted—be taken to involve core-dependency.
We can sum up our findings regarding the different types  of homonymy that are 
acknowledged by Aristotle thus: 
1. Accidental  discrete  homonyms.  These  are  chance  homonyms.  They  have 
nothing  definitional  in  common,  and  they  share  name  just  by  some 
coincidence of language. Because they have completely distinct definitions, 
they are characterized  as ‘far apart’, and are easy to detect. This is the kind of 
44 A very important early investigation into core-depedent homonymy was carried out by G.E.L. Owen 
(1960). In this paper he introduced the influential concept focal meaning to describe the dependency 
of non-core homonymous instances on a core instance. The definitions of all the non-core instances 
made reference to the definition of the core instance, i. e. the focal meaning. Owen regards homonymy 
as a phenomenon pertaining to words and word meaning, and being dissatisfied with this restriction of 
homonymy, T.H. Irwin (1981) coined the concept focal connection—which was meant to characterise 
the associated homonymy of things—as a revision of Owen’s original conceptual invention. 
45 The homonymy of ‘justice’ may be an example of associated but not core-dependent homonymy (Cf. 
Nicomachean Ethics, 1129a26–b1). Aristotle does at least not try to give an analysis of the association 
of the different types of justice by involving core-dependency. 
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homonyms often exploited in jokes. Examples: sharp, key, crane, bank, club.
2. Non-accidental  discrete  homonyms.  These  homonyms  have  nothing 
definitional in common, but it  is nevertheless not due to a mere linguistic 
accident that they share name. Non-functioning specimens of a kind belong in 
this group. Because they fail to perform the functions associated with their 
kind,  they are not genuine instances of the kind in question—they do not 
exhibit its essence—and are just homonymously called a finger, an axe etc. 
They only  appear to belong to the relevant kinds. It is their outward look 
which occasions their homonymous character. Many of these homonyms are 
anything but obvious, and are thus often neglected. (Appreciating them might 
even  depend  on  philosophical  reflections  on  what  it  is  that  constitutes 
toolhood or the being of organisms.)  Examples:  detached body parts, dead 
bodies, dysfunctional tools, statues, pictures.
3. Associated homonyms. These are homonyms whose definitions are somewhat 
related.  The relation or association between the homonyms consists  of the 
definitions  of  some  instances  making  reference  to,  or  containing  the 
definition  of,  some  other  thing.  Even  though  the  relation  or  association 
between  homonyms  could  be  thought  to  manifest  itself  in  various  ways, 
Aristotle is exclusively interested in relation to, or association around, a core 
instance. So, for all practical purposes, associated homonymy equals core-
dependent  homonymy  in  Aristotle.  Some  associated  homonyms,  such  as 
‘healthy’ and  ‘medical’ are  easily  appreciated,  but  most  are  very  hard  to 
detect and even heavily contested. Many of them are central philosophical 
concepts.  Examples:  healthy,  medical, being, goodness,  one, nature,  cause, 
priority, justice, friendship.         
2.6 The use of homonymy in Aristotle’s philosophy
As we have pointed out earlier, Aristotle appeals to homynymy in both destructive and 
constructive  contexts:  both  when  criticising  colleagues  and  in  developing  his  own 
positive views. Detection of homonymy is proven to be a powerful dialectical tool by 
Aristotle in that demonstration of homonymy in the arguments of his colleagues—for 
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example that what figures under the same name in the major and minor premiss are 
really  different  things—gives  reasons  for  rejecting  their  conclusions.  Appeals  to 
homonymy are thus frequently encountered in situations where Aristotle deals with the 
views of other philosophers. Refuting wrongheaded views and positions is of course an 
important and inevitable part of philosophical activity, but Aristotle’s use of homonymy 
is not confined to this purpose. In many contexts a demonstration of homonymy seems 
on the contrary to serve as a starting point for Aristotle’s own positive theorizing. For, in 
some cases there nevertheless exists some sort of order in the manifold of homonymous 
instances,  and with order comes the prospect of systematic knowledge and scientific 
endeavours. The cases in question are where the homonyms are associated. As we have 
seen,  Aristotle  holds  that  association  among  homonyms  involves  a  relation  of 
dependence  between non-core  instances  and a  core instance:  All  non-core instances 
stand in some asymmetric relation of dependence to the core instance. And this is a kind 
of ordering that provides sufficient unity for the establishing of a science. As Aristotle 
says in Metaphysics Gamma 2 :
For not only in the case of things which have one common notion (τῶν καθ’ ἓν 
λεγομένων) does the investigation belong to one science, but also in the case of 
things which are related to one common nature (τῶν πρὸς μίαν λεγομένων φύσιν); 
for even these in a sense (τρόπον) have one common notion. (1003b12–15)
          
So even though the Platonic condition for a science should not be met, viz. that all the  
objects are united under one common notion, Aristotle maintains that there can still be 
scientific investigation in a particular domain provided that the things in the domain are 
related to one nature, or as he expresses it a little earlier in the chapter: related to one 
source  (μίαν  ἀρχήν,  1003b6).  Core-dependent  homonymy  thus  proves  vital  for  the 
possibility of, among others, the sciences of being qua being (τὸ ὂν ᾖ ὂν) and the good, 
as Aristotle  famously rules out  Academy-style  sciences of these  subjects  due to  the 
homonymous character of both being and the good. In the Platonist Academy one would 
namely set as a condition for the possibility of a science that the objects in the domain 
of the science be subsumed under one genus, something which involves one common 
predicate  being  synonymously  predicated  of  all  of  them.  This  is  the  conception  of 
science that is presupposed for example by Socrates when he informs Meno that he is 
seeking the  one virtue,  and that  he  consequently has  little  interest  in  the  swarm of 
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different virtues brought to the discussion by Meno. For, ‘[e]ven if they are many and 
various, all of them have one and the same form which makes them virtues’ (72a4–c5). 46 
It is this one form of virtue that it belongs to the scientist of virtue to investigate, since 
the different kinds enumerated by Meno are all virtues owing to the fact that they share 
in the one and same paradigmatic idea of virtue; the one idea of virtue common to them 
all. 
Regarding many object domains, Aristotle is in agreement with Plato that the unity 
providing the possibility of scientific investigation into them is the unity given by the 
belonging to a common genus. In some important cases however,—and here we find an 
example of Aristotle’s employment of homonymy in a destructive context—this kind of 
unity is not forthcoming. But instead of precluding ambitions of scientific investigations 
in  these  cases—as  a  philosopher  with  a  strict  Platonist  upbringing  probably  would 
expect—, Aristotle invokes instead his alternative form of investigation made possible 
by his important discovery of core-dependent homonymy. Assuming, however, that no 
philosopher with deep-rooted Platonist dispositions would be moved even the slightest 
by loose indications on Aristotle’s part regarding the homonymous nature of some of his 
central scientific terms, and consequently the impossibility of his science, Aristotle will 
need  to  supply  arguments  both  to  the  effect  that  the  terms  in  question  really  are 
homonymous, and secondly, in order to establish the possibility of his own alternative 
scientific  treatment  of  the things  in  question,  to  demonstrate  an  ordered association 
amongst the things antecedently shown to be homonymous, that is, to prove what it is  
that accounts for the dependency of the non-core instances on the core instance of things 
non-accidentally  sharing  names.  But  not  even  the  first  of  these  tasks  is  as 
straightforward and easy as one at this moment perhaps is inclined to think. For when 
we take a look at the techniques Aristotle has at his disposal for detecting homonyms—
the tests introduced in chapter 15 in the first book of the Topics47—we find that most of 
them only track the most obvious cases of homonymy, and that all of the interesting and 
disputed associated homonyms are revealed only inconclusively or not at all in most of 
these tests. The purported homonymy of goodness, for example, will neither be detected 
by the test for opposites (‘good’ has ‘bad’ as an opposite both when applied to morally 
evaluable actions and peanuts), nor the test for intermediates (the ‘good–bad’ opposition 
lack intermediates in both scenarios depicted above), nor uncontroversially the test for 
comparability. The only tests that actually prove tough enough to decide the hard cases, 
46 The translations of Plato are all, unless otherwise noted, from Plato: Complete Works (Cooper, 1997). 
47 See 2.1.3 above.
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are the tests  that track difference in signification. I say ‘tests’ here, for even though 
Aristotle has only one test for difference in signification (107a3–4: ‘Look also at the 
classes  of  the  predicates  signified  by  the  term,  and see  if  they are  the  same in  all 
cases’48),  the  tests  for  both  difference  in  form49 (106a23–25,  translating  εἶδος  with 
‘form’ instead of ‘kind’) and difference in definition (107a36–b6) are closely related to 
signification, since (i) forms/essences are the items that in every case is signified, and 
(ii) definitions signify. The crucial element in these tests is of course that signification 
for Aristotle is signification of essence—as we touched upon in our excursus on the 
domain  of  homonymy50—and  that  a  demonstration  of  difference  in  signification 
between some words therefore amounts to a demonstration of difference in essence in 
the  things  denoted  by  the  words.  When  it  comes  to  demonstrating  difference  in 
signification it is absolutely crucial to acknowledge that a mere colloquial discussion is 
not  sufficient  for  accomplishing  this.  For  the  surface  meaning  of  the  words  might 
conceal  the  fact  that  they  really  denote  different  things  with  different  essences. 
Conversely, the surface meaning of a term can also make it appear ambiguous, even 
though it—on closer scrutiny—is not. Even though the essences figure in the  surface 
meanings  too,  they  do  so  through  features  or  modes  of  presentation  accidentally 
accompanying the essences, and are therefore not fully revealed as they are ‘in nature’ 
and ‘without qualification’,  but only as they happen to be revealed in some specific 
circumstance ‘for us’.51 On the level of surface meaning words can seem to signify the 
same even though they do not, and this makes it necessary to investigate further into the 
deep  meanings  of  the  words  in  order  to  conclusively  establish  differences  in 
signification. Only on the level of deep meaning are the essences grasped as they are in 
nature  and  without  qualification.  But  the  deep  meanings  of  terms  can  elude  even 
competent users of a language, so no loose reflection on the use of language is sufficient 
48 A couple of things should be said about this translation: (i) ‘Classes of predicates’ translates τὰ γένη 
τῶν κατηγοριῶν (classes of categories), and (ii) Aristotle does not actually use σημαίνειν (‘signify’) 
here. A more literal translation of the whole phrase (τὰ γένη τῶν κατὰ τοὔνομα κατηγοριῶν) would be  
something like: ‘the types of categories corresponding to the name’ (translating κατὰ τοὔνομα here as 
in 1a1–2 with ‘corresponding to the name’). But in this context the corresponding-relation is clearly a 
signification-relation (Aristotle is asking us to see if the substance, quality, quantity etc. corresponding 
to/signified  by  the  name in  the  different  cases  is  the  same or  not),  so  the  Oxford translation  is 
warranted in transliterating the phrase using ‘signify’.  
49 See 2.1.3 above.
50 See the very brief presentation of Aristotle’s view of signification in 2.1.2 above.
51 See  Physics,  184a16–21  for  a  clear  statement  of  Aristotle’s  view  on  the  levels  of  knowledge 
corresponding to the levels of meaning described above. (The highest level of knowledge is reached 
when one knows things through what is ‘more knowable in nature’ and ‘without qualification’, and 
not through what is ‘more knowable for us’.)
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for  demonstrating  difference  in  signification.  Only  methods  elsewhere  employed  in 
nailing the essences of things—be they philosophical analysis, empirical investigation, 
Socratic  elenchus  or  what  have  you—will  do.  So,  as  we  see,  determining  the 
signification of terms is not a purely linguistic endeavour for Aristotle. According to 
him, finding things out about the world is simultaneously finding things out about the 
words we use in talking about the world.52   
Having demonstrated a method for establishing homonymy even in the hard cases, 
Aristotle has advanced one crucial step in the direction of showing how he can make 
constructive  use  of  a  notion  of  homonymy  in  his  own  positive  philosophy.  What 
remains for him to do however, is to specify and substantiate the relation of asymmetric  
dependence holding between the non-core and core instance of associated homonyms. 
His sparse hints in this direction—about definitional containment and relation to one 
source—leaves much to be desired. For why is it the case that the definitions of non-
core things necessarily have to make reference to the core thing, whereas the latter does 
not  have  to  make  reference  to  any  of  the  non-core  things?  There  must  surely  be 
something,  presumably  about  the  source  (i.e.  the  core  instance),  that  explains  and 
grounds this definitional  asymmetry.  Since Aristotle at  best  provides the skeleton of 
such an explanation, he will—in order to establish a fully satisfactory understanding of 
core-dependent homonymy that is equipped to perform the tasks that he desires from it
—need help to flesh it out. In the next part I will present Christopher Shields’ causal  
analysis of core-dependent homonymy, an account that purports to contribute precisely 
such a fleshing out of Aristotle’s rough outline. 
52  See Metaphysics, 1004b1–4, where Aristotle states that it is the job of the philosopher, i.e. a scientist  
(and not just any competent user of a language) to determine in how many ways something is spoken.
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3 Core-dependent homonymy
Before presenting Shields’ causal analysis I  will  try to explain why Aristotle’s brief 
characterisation  of  associated  or  core-dependent  homonymy  amounts  to  an 
underspecification of the phenomenon, as was indicated in the last section. Saying next 
to nothing about what underlies the asymmetric definitional dependence between the 
core  and  non-core  instances  of  homonyms,  and  nothing  about  the  kind  of  priority 
enjoyed by the core  instance  or  source in  relation  to  the  others,  Aristotle’s  account 
suffers from a hollowness that makes it difficult to see in what way his concept of core-
dependent  homonymy could reasonably be taken to possess  the kind of explanatory 
power and scientific usefulness he ascribes to it. So, let us now begin the preliminary 
exposition of the shortcomings in Aristotle’s account. As we have seen numerous times 
already,  Aristotle  frequently  appeals  to  the  homonymy  of  ‘health’ or  ‘healthy’ in 
contexts  where he aims at  illustrating his  general  conception  of  associated  or  core-
dependent homonymy. Presumably, then, he must think of this as an especially clear and 
unproblematic case of core-dependent homonymy. The second chapter of  Metaphysics 
Gamma, in which Aristotle tries to establish the core-dependency of ‘being’, is perhaps 
the most famous of these contexts. Because of the status assigned to the homonymy of 
health as the example par excellence of core-dependent homonymy, it is natural to start 
an investigation into the nature of this type of homonymy by inspecting how Aristotle 
thinks  his  general  view on  these  types  of  homonymy is  clarified  by  the  examples 
involving ‘health’. Even though we have already numerous times cited and referred to 
parts of this chapter—thus having made the content and claims in it fairly well known 
by now—I will at this stage nevertheless cite at length the section most relevant for us: 
Just as everything which is healthy is related to health (πρὸς ὑγίειαν), some by 
preserving health, some by producing health, others by being indicative of health, 
and  others  by  being  receptive  of  health;  and  as  the  medical  is  relative  to  the 
medical  craft  (πρὸς ἰατρικήν),  for  some things are  called medical  because they 
possess the medical craft, others because they are well-constituted relative to it, and 
others by being the function of the medical craft—and we shall also discover other 
things said in ways similar to these—so too is being said in many ways, but always 
relative  to  some  one  source  (πρὸς  μίαν  ἀρχήν).  (Metaphysics,  1003a34–b6, 
Shields’ translation.) 
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The claim in this passage is that even though ‘healthy’ is said in many ways, i.e. is 
homonymous, the different sayings or instances of ‘healthy’ are nevertheless, in some 
theoretically  interesting  way,  associated.  For  unlike  cases  of  discrete  homonymy 
(accidental and non-accidental), all the different instances of ‘healthy’ are related to, or 
associate around, one core notion of health. So, for any thing of which it is said that it is 
healthy, Aristotle tells us, we will find that an account of what the healthiness in the 
particular case consists of will make reference to the core notion. Let us assume that the 
core notion of health is that of a state of well-being and well-functioning of persons. If 
this is so, persons are what is healthy in a primary sense, and any explication of other 
instances of healthiness must refer back to the health residing in persons. A healthy tan 
can thus be explicated as a skin hue that is indicative of the health of a person, a healthy 
meal as something which is productive (or perhaps rather preservative) of health in a 
person, and a healthy lifestyle as a lifestyle that contributes in some way or other to the 
health of a person. In this clarification of his view, we see that Aristotle uses the notion 
of ‘relation to one source’ in specifying the way in which core-dependent homonyms 
associate. All the instances of ‘healthy’, in ‘healthy tan’, ‘healthy meal’ and ‘healthy 
lifestyle’, are understood in terms of (or with reference to) the core notion of health. It is  
this ordering—the relation to a core instance—that is taken to account for the partial 
definitional  overlap  existing  between  cases  of  associated  or  core-dependent 
homonyms.53 For the sake of clarity we can summarise Aristotle’s conception of core-
dependent homonymy as it is expressed in the above cited passage thus: 
CDH: x and y are homonymously in a core-dependent way F iff: (i) they have 
their name in common, (ii) their definitions do not completely overlap, and (iii) 
there is a single source to which they are related.54
Even though the third condition—about the relation to a single source—to some extent 
helps to clarify the nature of the type of association holding between core-dependent 
homonyms,  the great diversity of permitted relations—as revealed in the example—
53 It is because Aristotle everywhere (like here) characterises association of homonyms by the notion of  
‘relation to one source’ that we are justified in using ‘associated homonyms’ and ‘core-dependent  
homonyms’ interchangeably.  
54 Adopted from Shields (1999, 106).
38
nevertheless  leaves  it  fundamentally  obscure.  Aristotle’s  sparse illustration leaves  us 
wondering both about what kinds of relations are sufficiently strong for establishing 
association,  and what  it  is  that makes one instance core in relation to  others.  In an 
illustrative example construed in order to exhibit the deficiencies of Aristotle’s formal 
specification of core-dependent homonymy, Christopher Shields shows how even the 
obviously homonymous ‘bank’ can pass as core-dependent:
If savings banks were always as a matter of fact located within five hundred miles 
of  river  banks,  someone  might  mistake  this  as  essential  of  them and  offer  an 
account according to which savings banks were those institutions located within 
five hundred miles of river banks where money is kept and traded. (Shields, 1999, 
108)
Since the accounts of savings banks in this scenario makes reference to river banks, the 
cases of ‘bank’ will here qualify as core-dependent, something that is obviously deeply 
unsatisfactory. The problem with Aristotle’s specification of core-dependent homonyms 
is  that  it  contains  no  restrictions  or  ‘controls  on  the  sort  of  appeals  definitions  are 
permitted  to  make  to  other  definitions’ (Shields,  1999,  108).  What  we  lack  from 
Aristotle is an abstract characterisation of the nature of the relations homonymous terms 
must bear to the core notion (Shields, 1999, 107).
Although  the  nature  of  the  relation  between  core-dependent  homonyms  is 
underspecified  by  Aristotle,  his  example  nevertheless  shows  us  that  the  relation  is 
presumed to be asymmetrical. It is thus not only the case that every instance of some 
core-dependent  homonym must  stand in  a  relation to  one source;  this  relation must 
additionally be asymmetrical in such a way that the account of the non-core cases must 
make reference to the core case, whereas the account of the core case need not make 
reference to the non-core cases. The accounts of ‘healthy’ in ‘healthy tan’ and ‘healthy 
meal’ will thus have to make reference to the account of ‘healthy’ in ‘healthy person’. 
The account of ‘healthy’ in ‘healthy person’, on the other hand, will not make reference 
to any of the accounts of the non-core instances of ‘healthy’. But, why is it  that an 
account of what it is for a person to be healthy is prohibited from making reference to 
traits that typically distinguish healthy persons, such as their distinctive tan, posture or 
vigour? Aristotle will need a notion of priority to ground this asymmetry, and this is 
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something that is not provided by CDH alone. What we are now in a position to see is 
that a fully fleshed out notion of core-dependent homonymy hinges on a satisfactory 
specification of the relation obtaining between associated homonyms. Clause (iii)  in 
CDH is  thus  in  need of  revision.  Since Aristotle  presumes that  the  relation holding 
between the core and non-core instances is asymmetric, the specification must at least 
capture  this  much.  When initiating  the  analysis  that  we  will  turn  to  in  a  moment, 
Christopher Shields accordingly states that  what is wanted in a complete account of 
core-dependent homonymy is a specification of some asymmetrical relation R, that all 
non-core instances of a homonym necessarily bear to the core: 
Necessarily, if (i) a is F and b is F, (ii) F-ness is associatively homonymous in 
these applications, and (iii) a is a core instance of F-ness, then b’s being F stands 
in R to a’s being F. (Shields, 1999, 110)
The constraints laid on R is that it be asymmetrical, that it be open-ended so as to admit 
of new cases of non-core homonyms, and that the accounts of all the non-core cases 
make reference to the account of the core case (1999, 110). We will now turn to Shields’ 
analysis and his suggested specification of R. 
    
3.1 Core-dependent homonymy: Shields’ causal analysis
How one account (λόγος) can depend on another is one of the things one expects R to 
address.  More specifically,  one  expects  R to  explain  the explanatory  priority  of  the 
account of the core case of a homonym in relation to all the non-core cases. In his 
analysis  of  core-dependent  homonymy Christopher  Shields  is  heavily  influenced  by 
Cardinal Cajetan’s specification of  R  in terms of the Aristotelian four-causal scheme, 
and he speculates that it was perhaps because Cajetan recognized the crucial importance 
of explanatory priority that he offered such a specification. Conditions of explanatory 
adequacy are namely  of central  concern in this  scheme.55 Due to the importance of 
55 See Physics 198a14-b9 for an introduction of Aristotle’s four-causal explanatory scheme. To know a 
thing is according to Aristotle to know  why  (διὰ τί) it  is  so, and the stating of the four causes in 
relation to an object (viz. to state its causes) is supposed to adequately answer complementary why-
questions with respect to it.   
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Cajetan’s causal  specification of  R  in  Shields’ analysis—it should in  fact  merely be 
regarded  as  a  refinement  of  Cajetan’s  suggestion—I will  cite  at  length  the  passage 
where Cajetan’s interpretative proposal is presented:
  
Analogy of this type [analogy of attribution, or πρὸς ἓν homonymy56] can come 
about in four ways, according to the four genera of causes (calling for the moment 
the exemplary cause the formal cause).  It  may occur with respect  to some one 
denomination and attribution that many things stand in different ways to one end, 
to one efficient cause, to one exemplar and to one subject, as is clear from the  
examples of Aristotle’s Metaphysics iv. For the example of health in Metaphysics 
iv refers to the final cause, while the example of medical in the same place refers to 
the efficient cause, the analogy of being, also in the same place, to the material  
cause, while the analogy of good, introduced in Ethics i. 7, refers to the exemplary 
cause. (De Nominum Analogia 2.9, cited from Shields, 1999, 110)
Although he considers Cajetan’s examples to be misguiding, Shields deems Cajetan’s 
basic  idea  to  be  ‘exactly  right’ (1999,  111).  The  problem with  Cajetan’s  examples, 
according  to  Shields,  is  that  they  make  it  seem  that  each  homonym  (‘medical’, 
‘healthy’, ‘good’ etc.) is limited to just one of the four causal relations. That is, Cajetan 
appears to believe that the derived (i.e. non-core) instances of ‘medical’, for example, 
are limited to refer to the efficient case, whereas the derived instances of ‘healthy’ are 
limited to refer to the final cause. The relations that Aristotle mentions in illustrating 
core-dependencies,  however,  do  not  seem  to  support  such  limitations.  The  scalpel 
(μαχαίριον), for its part, is not called medical because it is related by an efficient cause 
to medicine, but rather because its function (i.e. final cause) is provided by its role in 
medical practice (Metaphysics, 1003b1–3, 1061a3–5). A doctor, on the other hand, will 
qualify as medical because he (or maybe better: his soul) possesses the craft of medicine 
(Metaphysics, 1003b1-2). It is thus wrong to assume—as Cajetan seems to do—that all 
the particular cases of some specific core-dependent homonym are related only by one 
kind of cause to the core notion.  One should rather suppose that different  non-core 
instances of the same core-dependent homonym can stand in different kinds of causal 
56 Cajetan is here treating core-dependent homonymy (or πρὸς ἓν homonymy) as a case of analogy, or 
more precisely, analogy of attribution. As we have pointed out earlier, this was the usual practice in  
medieval philosophy. For more on this, see footnote 30. Every instance of ‘analogy’ in the above cited 
passage should thus be read as synonymous with core-dependent homonymy. 
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relations to the same core. 
Taking out what he judges to be right from Cajetan’s interpretative suggestion, while 
leaving out what he deems peculiar and wrong, Shields formulates a completely general 
specification of R which he calls four-causal core primacy:             
FCCP:  Necessarily,  if  (i)  a  is  F  and  b  is  F,  (ii)  F-ness  is  associatively  
homonymous in these applications, and (iii) a is a core instance of F-ness, then 
b’s being F stands in one of the four causal relations to  a’s being  F. (Shields,  
1999, 111)
Christopher Shields defends this suggested specification of R in three stages. In the first 
stage, he shows how the specification grows naturally from some of the illustrations of 
core-dependent  homonymy given by Aristotle  himself.  In  the  second  stage,  Shields 
tackles  apparent  difficulties  related  to  reconciling  FCCP with  some of  the  other  of 
Aristotle’s  illustrations,  proceeding  to  argue  that  what  initially  appeared  to  be 
problematic cases for FCCP, in the end strengthen it. In the third and final stage, it is 
shown that FCCP meets the constraints for specifications of R57, that is, that it is both 
sufficiently definite and suitably open-ended. In what follows I will go through these 
stages successively.
Let  us  turn  to  Aristotle’s  two  favourite  examples  of  core-dependent  homonymy, 
‘healthy’ and ‘medical’, and see how or whether they can reasonably be said to fit the 
specification of R in terms of FCCP. In Metaphysics  Gamma 2 Aristotle states that all 
healthy things are related to one thing, health, ‘either by preserving it (τῷ φυλάττειν), 
producing it (τῷ ποιεῖν), indicating it (τῷ σημεῖον), or by being receptive of it (δεκτικὸν 
αὐτῆς)’ (1003a35–b1). In a similar way, things are called medical ‘either by possessing 
it  (i.e.  the  craft)  (τῷ  ἔχειν),  by  being  naturally  suited  to  it  (τῷ  εὐφυὲς  εἶναι  πρὸς 
αὐτὴν58), or by being a function of it (τῷ ἔργον)’ (1003b2–3, my translations). Shields 
points out that even though these various examples display different possible relations 
between core and non-core cases of ‘healthy’ and ‘medical’ respectively, all of them 
57 See at the very end of 2.2
58 Shields writes with regard to this example that what Aristotle probably has in mind here is that some  
people may count as medical even though they lack professional training as doctors. They can, for 
example,  simply  have  a  knack  for  healing  (e.g.  through  the  use  of  natural  remedies),  or  be  in 
possession  of  the  sort  of  intelligence—pared  with  certain  other  dispositions—that  makes  them 
naturally equipped for medical tasks (see footnote 10, 112). 
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immediately seem specifiable in (four-)causal  terms. Some instances are particularly 
clear. Consider for example a scalpel.59 A scalpel is medical because its function (ἔργον) 
is medical, viz. to cut in medical procedures. The core-dependent homonymy is obvious 
in this case ‘because the final cause [i.e. function] of a scalpel is easy to specify relative 
to the core notion of medicine’ (Shields, 1999, 112). The cases of healthy regimens and 
diets are similarly clear. A particular regimen is healthy because it produces (ποιεῖν) 
health. And, obviously, when something is productive of health, it will necessarily stand 
in an efficient causal relation to health. The cases of the medical scalpel and the healthy 
regimen, then, support FCCP by conforming to it. Not all of Aristotle’s illustrations, 
however,  are  as  clearly  specifiable  in  causal  terms.  Shields  mentions  the  case  of  a 
complexion being healthy by being indicative (σημεῖον) of health, and that of vitamins 
being healthy because they preserve or guard (φυλάττειν) health, and marks that neither 
‘being indicative of’ nor ‘preserving’ are obvious instances of any of the four causal 
relations (1999, 113). They thus seem to pose a challenge to FCCP. However, Shields 
quickly dismisses this  possibility, for FCCP does not demand that the core of every 
homonym must be the causal source of the non-core instances60: ‘That is, although it is 
in some sense an ἀρχὴ, the core notion need not be causally prior to the derived cases’  
(1999, 113).61 That the derived cases of a homonym need only stand in one of the four 
causal relations to the core without any additional restriction regarding the ‘direction of 
the causality’ (113), should actually be clear already from the example of regimen. A 
regimen is called healthy on the grounds that it produces health, and is thus an example 
of an efficient cause. In efficient causality, the causal direction is from the producing 
instance to the produced (i.e. the result), which in this case is health. So in the case of  
producing health, the causal direction is  to  the core  from a non-core case. Something 
59 The scalpel is introduced as an example of something medical in Metaphysics Kappa 3, 1061a3–5. It 
is there said to be medical because it is useful (ταύτῃ χρήσιμον) to the medical science. 
60 It is not at all clear to me why Shields thinks that it is because one expects the core to be the causal  
source of the non-core instances of a homonym that the relations ‘indicative of’ and ‘preserving’ do 
not at a first glance seem to conform to FCCP. The relation ‘indicative of’, for example, will quite to  
the contrary—as we shall see shortly—seem to meet precisely such an expectation. I have, however,  
chosen to stay close to the steps in Shields exposition at this point—instead of trying to clean it up—
since  this  would  naturally  provide  me with  the  opportunity  to  introduce  his  intriguing  statement 
regarding causal priority and FCCP. (See below.)         
61 This statement is actually very surprising, for if the core instance of a homonym is not causally prior  
to the non-core instances, then causal specifications of the relations between them will not establish 
the kind of asymmetrical  dependence of the non-core instances on the core that  we expected any  
specification  of  R  to  provide  (included FCCP).  Besides,  the  core being  ‘in  some sense  a  source 
(ἀρχὴ)’ in relation to the non-core instances is still what is going to explain its being prior to them, and 
how something in this situation can be prior by being the source in another way than being causally 
prior has a tint of mystery to it. I will return to these matters later.  
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that  is  healthy  in  a  derived sense,  namely  a  healthy  regimen,  is  thus,  according to  
Shields, causally prior to the core case in situations like this. 
When we now consider the case of ‘preserving’ we find that it actually is very similar  
to that of ‘producing’.  When we say, for example,  that a diet is  healthy,  we say so 
because it preserves health by contributing, in a nutritive way, to the maintenance of the 
health  of  a  person.  A  healthy  lifestyle  will  similarly  preserve  health  because  it 
contributes to the health of a person by, say, regulating daily exercises, moderation in 
eating  and  drinking,  total  abstinence  from  smoking  etc.  We  see  then  that  the 
preservation of health brought about by a diet or a lifestyle should be reckoned as an 
instance of efficient causality just as the regimen was. The fact that neither a diet nor a 
lifestyle can be said to maintain health in a person solely by themselves, gives no reason 
for doubting this, for something can count as an efficient cause of x even though it is not 
alone  responsible  for  the preservation of  x.  Being one among several  factors  which 
together are sufficient for the production/preservation of some result,  will  namely in 
many circumstances be enough to be regarded as an efficient cause by Aristotle.62 Since 
preserving counts as an efficient cause, this example provides further support for FCCP.
Also in the cases of something being ‘indicative of’ we are dealing with efficient 
causality. But in these cases the causal direction goes the opposite way, that is, from the 
core  to the  non-core  instances.  A healthy  complexion,  for  example,  will  qualify  as 
healthy because it is indicative of the health of a person. The healthy complexion is in 
this case brought about by the health of a person: The healthy look of the skin results  
from, viz. is efficiently caused by, the well-being (i.e. health) of the organism (i.e. the 
person). But also here we need to stress that one must not think of health  as alone 
sufficient for the bringing about of a healthy complexion. There are other conditions co-
responsible for a healthy complexion that must also be satisfied. Nor is it the case that a 
healthy complexion guarantees a healthy constitution (viz. health in a person), for, as 
Shields says, ‘some signs are misleading’ (1999, 114). But since Aristotle holds that 
efficient causal connections are compatible with some degree of non-regularity,63 it is 
reasonable to understand the relation in question, i.e. ‘indicative of’, as an example of 
efficient causation too. So this example also contributes supporting evidence for FCCP.
The examples we have considered so far show that Aristotle’s various illustrations of 
62 See for example Physics, 194b13: ‘Man is begotten [produced, γεννᾷ] by man and by the sun as well.’
63 Aristotle says that there are genuine causal relations ‘where things always comes to pass in the same  
way, … or for the most part’ (Physics, 196b10–12, my italics).
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kinds of relations between core-dependent homonyms at least can be specified in terms 
of efficient and final causation. But what about material causation? Examples of this are 
much less obvious. Perhaps we have examples of material  causation in cases where 
things are called healthy because they are receptive (δεκτικὸν) of health? This, at least,  
is Shields’ suggestion (1999, 114). As with the other relations, Aristotle does not give 
any concrete examples of things being receptive of health, so one is forced to search for 
possible candidates by oneself. Shields proposes material substrates and supports his 
suggestion  by  explaining  that  Aristotle  typically  characterizes  material  substrates  as 
receptive of forms when thinking of them as a material causes. One place in the corpus 
where this comes out clearly is in the Metaphysics Delta:
That in which a thing is present as in something receptive is said to have the thing, 
e.g. the bronze has the form of the statue, and the body has the disease. (1023a11–
1364)
Muscles, arteries and blood—being material substrates of human organisms—can thus 
be regarded as healthy because they are material causes of the health of a person by 
being  receptive  of  health.  That  blood  can  qualify  as  a  material  cause  for  health, 
however, also helps to illuminate another aspect of FCCP, namely that derived instances 
of  a  homonym are  permitted  to  stand in  more  than one  causal  relation  to  the  core 
instance. For blood can obviously also stand in an efficient causal relation to health, by 
being indicative of health—blood tests are after all used as a diagnostic tool in medicine
—so that ‘healthy’ in ‘healthy blood’ can be seen to be ‘doubly derived’ (Shields, 1999, 
114). 
From  the  above  considerations  of  Aristotle’s  illustrations  we  see  that  non-core 
instances of homonyms can at least stand in three of Aristotle’s four causal relations to 
the  core  instance:  final,  efficient,  and  material.  None  of  his  examples,  though, 
constitutes  an obvious case of formal causation.  Furthermore,  some very reasonable 
questions can be raised about whether to stand in a relation of formal causation to the 
core  instance  of  some  homonym  can  ever  exemplify  a  case  of  core-dependent 
homonymy. The reason for this is that when something is a formal cause of something 
64 Cf. Metaphysics, 1018a25–30 and 1056a25–27. Note the occurrences of ‘receptive material’ in these 
places. 
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else, the form of the first thing is responsible for the existence of that very same form 65 
in  the  other  thing,  and when the  same form inheres  in  both  things,  they will  have 
identical accounts of being and thus be synonyms (and not homonyms). This reasoning 
makes the mere thought of specifications of relations among homonyms in terms of 
formal  causation  seem  ridiculous.  An  attempt  at  a  four-causal  account  of  the 
connections  between  core-dependent  homonyms  will  thus  seem  to  exhibit  a  grave 
ignorance with respect to something very elementary in Aristotelian philosophy, namely 
that uniformity implies synonymy. One is then probably best advised to restrict FCCP 
by  ruling  out  the  possibility  of  formal  causal  relations  among  non-core  and  core 
homonyms. In fact, this would amount to a substitution of FCCP with a  three-causal 
principle. But, according to Christopher Shields, such a rejection of FCCP based on a 
dismissal of the possibility of formal causal relations among homonyms is mistaken. 
The argument with the negative conclusion that FCCP should be rejected must namely 
have as a premise that ‘formal causation is sufficient for univocity [i.e. synonymy] and 
so incompatible with homonymy’ (1999, 116). But this premise, Shields claims, is false. 
For even though F is univocal in most of the cases where something’s being  F is the 
formal cause of something else’s being F, ‘Aristotle also recognizes instances of formal 
causation  where  this  does  not  hold’ (1999,  116).  Shields’ picks  an  example  from 
Aristotle’s  theory  of  perception.  In  perception,  according  to  Aristotle,  the  sensory 
faculty receives the form of the sensible object (τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν), without its matter 
(ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης,  De Anima, 424a17). What Aristotle means here is not that the sense 
organs takes on the qualities of the sensible objects, that the organ itself becomes red, 
hard or lobster-esque, ‘but that they becomes isomorphic with the objects of perception 
representatively’ (1999, 116). Shields characterises these two different modes of having 
the  sensible  form in  terms  of  encoding and  exemplifying.  When sensible  forms  are 
exemplified in objects, the qualities themselves (redness, hardness, etc.) are manifest in 
the objects. When the sensible forms are encoded in the sense organs, on the other hand, 
the sensory faculties ‘are in a state corresponding to—and fully representative of—a 
given set of perceptual qualities’66 (1999, 116). It  is because Aristotle acknowledges 
encoding as a kind of formal realization that Shields thinks that it is wrong to assume 
65 At  least  specifically,  if  not  also  numerically.  One’s  stand  in  the  debate  on  particular  forms  will  
determine one’s view here. To turn confessional, I am a believer in particular forms, so in my view the 
forms inherent in the two things are only specifically, and not numerically, the same. I will, however,  
not argue for the existence of particular forms here, but see Frede/Patzig (1988) and Lloyd (1981) for  
convincing arguments in their favour. 
66 See  Shields  (1995)  for  his  account  on  perceptual  isomorphism,  and  more  on  encoding  and 
exemplifying.
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that formal causation implies synonymy between the instance that causes and the caused 
instance. It is the redness of the lobster that causes the sense organ to be red, but being 
red for the lobster is different from being red for the sense organ. They both realize the 
form  red, but they realize it differently, the one by exemplifying it and the other by 
encoding it, so they are red homonymously. However, as Shields admits, Aristotle does 
nowhere explicitly state that the sense and the sensible object are homonymously  F, 
where F is some sensible form, and thus never openly grants that to realize a form in 
different  ways is  sufficient for homonymy. Besides,  it  is  very difficult  to find other 
uncontroversial examples of core and non-core homonyms related by formal causation. 
Shields launches the hard-to-understand case of something’s being medical by being 
‘naturally  suited  to  it’ (τῷ  εὐφυὲς  εἶναι  πρὸς  αὐτὴν,  Metaphysics,  1003b2–3)  as  a 
possible candidate. For, as he says, if what Aristotle means here is that someone lacking 
medical education and professional training nevertheless can be regarded as medical by 
possessing, say, a natural talent or inclination for healing, then he seems to think that the 
medical  craft  (viz.  the  form  of  a  doctor)  is  manifest  in  this  person,  albeit  in  an 
incomplete way. If this is so, Shields continues, ‘then a folk healer will count as medical 
because of standing in an appropriate formal causal relation to medicine’ (1999, 118). 
This example opens for the possibility that two things can count as Fs in different ways, 
not only by realizing  F-ness differently (i.e. encoding it or exemplifying it, as in the 
case of perception), but also by exemplifying  F-ness differently (1999, 118). Aristotle 
may then want to claim that a doctor and a folk healer—despite the fact that they both  
stand in  a  formal  causal  relation  to  medicine—exemplify  the  medical  craft  in  such 
different ways that ‘medical’ is said homonymously of them. But again, we do not find 
Aristotle saying in any other place in the corpus that things which similarly exemplify a 
form differently, for that reason should be regarded as homonymous. Actually, quite the 
contrary. For, if we remember his view concerning the determination of kinds, namely 
that kinds are functionally determined67, we see that membership in a kind—and thus 
the possessing of a form (or essence)—seems to be an on–off matter, and not something 
that comes in degrees: Either the thing fulfils the function associated with the kind, or it 
does not. In the first case it  will  qualify as a member of the kind, and will  thereby 
possess  the  relevant  form,  in  the  second  it  will  not,  and  will  accordingly  lack  the 
relevant form. A person who actually manages to heal, and so fulfils the function of the 
medical craft, would seem to qualify as a doctor (and thus possess the form of a doctor), 
and I have difficulties in seeing how he can be a doctor differently (i.e. homonymously) 
67 See 2.1.4.
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just because he is, say, less than a perfect realizer of the craft of medicine. On the basis 
of the functional determination thesis (FD), it seems enough to be able to do what a 
doctor  does  in  order  to  count  as  a  doctor  (fully  and  completely),  with  no  further 
restrictions  as to how many successful  treatments  one has performed (or whatever). 
What he is, namely a doctor,  seems to be the same, even though he should be less 
successful or less good at being a doctor than his colleague. If it seems right to some to 
differentiate what something is on the basis of how good it is at performing its function, 
this would be so, I guess, to a stronger degree with regard to artefacts than to natural 
kinds. For, whereas it does somehow sound reasonable that something can be a knife to 
a fuller or lesser extent by being more or less suited to cut, the same cannot be said of,  
for example, trees or cows. Something cannot be more or less a tree or a cow: Either 
you are a tree, or you are not, and ditto with cows.68 So I certainly do not find Shields’ 
reasoning persuasive regarding natural kinds. But on closer scrutiny, I don’t really find 
his reasoning persuasive with regard to artefacts either. It seems namely all too clear 
that Aristotle holds that what makes a thing be what it is, is the function it performs, so 
that there does not seem to be any other way of exemplifying a form than by fulfilling 
the function associated with it, and again, this is an on–off matter, and not something 
that comes in degrees. What the thing is able to do, determines what kind of thing it is, 
and the varying degrees of perfection with which it can perform its proper task does not 
really seem to influence what it is at all, and one is therefore not justified in saying that 
an imperfect and a perfect knife are knives homonymously. But maybe I have slightly 
misrepresented Shields’ point regarding the different ways of exemplifying a form by 
casting it so clearly in terms of levels of realization. For in illustrating how a form of a  
teacher can be exemplified differently by a Buddhist monk and a chief mechanic in a 
garage, Shields says: 
[Because] we regard them as engaging in radically different activities, or as being 
disparate  sorts  of  entities  altogether,  we  may  be  disinclined  to  treat  them  as 
exemplifying the same craft in the same way. (1999, 118)
So maybe exemplifying a form differently should not be understood in terms of levels 
68 Cf. Categories, 3b34: ‘Substance, it seems, does not admit of a more and a less. I do not mean that  
one substance is  not more  a substance than another (we have  said that  it  is),  but  that  any given  
substance is not called more, or less, that which it is.’
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of  realization,  but  rather  by  being  engaged  in  different  kinds  of  activities.  But,  in 
characterizing them as engaged in ‘radically different activities’ has he not lost sight of 
the supposed common craft that they are said to be practitioners of? For assuming that 
being a teacher is one thing (i.e. a unified phenomenon) and thus constitutes a kind, 
there  must  be  a  goal  (τέλος)  that  specifies  what  a  teacher  is  for.  Let  us  say  (in  a 
somewhat  old-fashioned  way)  that  this  is  to  produce  knowledge  in  students.  The 
function of the teacher will thus be to engage in knowledge-enhancing activities towards 
students. In this respect, the activities of the Buddhist monk and the chief mechanic 
seem exactly the same. It is only if there were completely distinct goals and functions 
belonging to the teaching activities of the monk and the mechanic that it would be right 
to  speak  of  ‘radically  different  activities’.  But  if  this  were  the  case,  then  ‘being  a 
teacher’ would  constitute  different  kinds  in  the  two  cases,  and  the  monk  and  the 
mechanic  would,  due  to  FD,  exemplify  different  forms.  So,  unless  there  can  be 
assembled other and more convincing considerations than those offered by Shields, it is 
difficult to see how forms can be exemplified differently. And secondly, to see how this 
could  ground homonymy—a kind of homonymy among uniform things—, and thus 
constitute an example of homonymous things that are related by formal causation, is 
doubly difficult.  The idea of things exemplifying some specific form differently thus 
seems of no help to Shields in his search for cases of homonyms related by formal 
causation. Besides, what Aristotle has in mind when he speaks of being ‘naturally suited 
to [the medical]’ (1003b2–3), is probably not possessors of the craft of medicine (as 
Shields suggests), but more likely bodies or instruments. The kind of causal relation he 
probably intends to characterize by this locution is thus either that of material or final 
causation.69 
Since things which are well-constituted relative to the medical most likely, in the 
light  of  the  above discussion,  fail  to  qualify as  instances  of  homonyms standing in 
formal causal relations, Shields’ example from perception—that the perceiver and the 
perceived are homonymously  red—is arguably the only defensible case of  a  formal 
causal  relation  between  homonyms.  The  formal  causation  involved  in  perception, 
however, is of a very peculiar sort, and one which is unique to perception. This is due to 
the  nature  of  the  sensible  matter  of  the  sense  organ.  The  sense  organ  is  namely 
potentially like what the perceived object is actually (De Anima, 418a3–4), so that the 
change  involved in  perception—the sense organ taking on the  form of  the  sensible 
69 For examples of material and final causal relations between homonyms, see the discussions of medical  
instruments and healthy bodies above. 
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object (424a19)—is not a case of qualitative change, but rather a change to its (i.e. the 
sense organ’s) ‘dispositions and nature’ (τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὴν φύσιν, 417b17). So the kind 
of formal causation described in such a situation is only possible thanks to the presence 
of sensible matter, viz. a ‘capacity for sensible awareness’ (Ward, 2008, 82), in the sense 
organ. This means that the only kind of formal causal relation that Shields has found to 
obtain between homonyms proves to be an extremely uninteresting one insofar as it 
only occurs in perception and thanks to sensible matter. It will thus never figure in the  
explanations of the relations among any of the philosophically significant associated or 
core-dependent homonyms enumerated by Aristotle (e.g. being, goodness, life, cause, 
justice, friendship), due to the lack of sensible matter in these cases.70 The upshot of this 
is that only three of Aristotle’s four causes from his four-causal explanatory scheme can 
really be said to be applicable in specifications of the relations that derived homonyms 
have to their core homonyms. It consequently seems that Shields should rather opt for a 
three-causal specification of R instead of his proposed four-causal specification (FCCP). 
This would constitute no real defeat for Shields however, for what is most important in 
his proposal is the demonstration that Aristotelian causal explanations can be used in 
specifying the relations that core and non-core instances of homonyms stand in with 
respect  to  each  other.  But  since  the  inclusion  of  formal  causation  in  FCCP is  not 
downright  wrong  (for  we  have  after  all  an  instance  of  formal  causation—though 
unrecognised by Aristotle—between the homonymous cases of redness in the sensible 
object and redness in the sense organ), and neither causes any harm, I will not demand a 
revision of his principle, but grant Shields his four-causal specification of R. 
To sum up, we have now worked ourselves through the first two stages of Shields’ 
defence of FCCP. That is, we have seen how a specification of  R  in terms of FCCP 
grows naturally from some of Aristotle’s own examples of core-dependent homonyms 
(e.g. that being ‘productive of health’ is a case of efficient causality), and that what 
initially seemed to pose problems for FCCP in the end fitted and confirmed it (e.g. the 
variation of the causal direction relative to the core). We have nevertheless, contrary to 
Shields, found reason to doubt that homonyms could be related by formal causation in 
70 Cf. Ward’s critique of Shields’ use of perception as an example of a formal causal relation between 
homonymous things: ‘But the issue at hand concerns whether sense perception provides the kind of 
model of formal causation, non-standard or otherwise, that could serve as an explanation of causation 
in cases of core-dependent homonymy; I do not think this is the case. One consideration involves the 
fact that the causation involved in sense perception is sui generis due to the nature of sensible matter: 
perception involves a kind of change in the sense organ that is unique because of its capacity for  
sensible awareness. In this regard, the activity of sense perception depends on certain features, like  
awareness and representation, which are not present in other kinds of causal processes in other kinds 
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any interesting way. But since there actually are some homonyms which are related by 
formal causation—in the (for us) uninteresting71 situations of perception—we will grant 
Shields the right to say that any non-core instance of a homonym must stand in one of  
the four causal relations to the core instance, even though none of the relations between 
instances of any of the most significant homonyms in Aristotle’s philosophy will be 
specified in terms of formal causation. 
Having  demonstrated  that  the  relations  obtaining  between  core  and  non-core 
homonyms  should  be  specified  in  causal  terms,  the  definition  of  core-dependent 
homonymy  given  earlier  can  now  be  improved  by  exchanging  CDH (iii)  with  the 
relevant part of FCCP: 
CDH*: a and b are homonymously F in a core-dependent way iff: (i) they have 
their name in common, (ii) their definitions do not completely overlap, and (iii) 
necessarily, if a is a core instance of F-ness, then b’s being F stands in one of the 
four causal relations to a’s being F. (Shields, 1999, 119)
This account, Shields says, is ‘intended to capture the spirit of Cajetan’s proposal by 
restricting the relation R to the four-causal scheme’ (1999, 119). 
The last thing that remains for Shields to do in his defence of FCCP (and thereby also 
CDH*) is to show that it is, as I said earlier, ‘sufficiently definite and suitably open-
ended’.72 This is best done, according to Shields, by showing that it rules out ‘unwanted 
junk relations’ (1999, 119). We will now, by giving one paradigmatic example, show 
how it does so. In my introduction to the part on core-dependent homonymy I cited a 
scenario designed by Shields  to  expose  the  deficiencies  of  Aristotle’s  all  too  rough 
characterisation of core-dependent homonymy (CDH), in which savings banks and river 
banks came out as core-dependent homonyms. The non-contingent relation responsible 
for the fact that they qualified as core-dependent in this scenario, was that savings banks 
were  always  positioned within  five  hundred  miles  of  river  banks.  This  is  a  typical 
example  of  the  kind  of  junk relation  that  we want  CDH* to  rule  out.  So does  it? 
Because  (i)  ‘being  positioned within  five  hundred miles  of’ a  river  bank  is  not  an 
example of any of Aristotle’s four causes, and (ii)  R  as specified by FCCP requires 
71 Due to the peculiarity of sensible matter.
72 See under 3.1.
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precisely that it should be (viz. in order to satisfy CDH* (iii)), it follows that (iii) river 
banks and savings banks do not qualify as core-dependent homonyms (Shields, 1999, 
119).  That  CDH* accordingly  rules  out  junk  relations  shows  that  it  is  sufficiently 
definite. The fact that it will properly encompass all instances of homonyms that happen 
to stand in one of the four causal relations to a core instance, shows, on the other hand, 
that it is suitably open-ended. It will namely permit ‘determination [of core-dependent 
homonyms]  on  a  case-by-case  basis’  and  will  ‘not  preclude  the  development  or 
extension of a homonymous concept through time’ (Shields, 1999, 119).
Being  sufficiently  definite  and  open-ended,  FCCP satisfies  much  of  what  was 
demanded from a specification of the relation  R obtaining between derived and core 
instances of a homonym. But since FCCP holds just because the direction of the causal 
relation can go both to and from the core homonym—a healthy lifestyle is an efficient 
cause of a person’s health, and a person’s health is at the same time an efficient cause of 
his healthy complexion—, it does not capture the way in which the non-core instances 
are supposed to be asymmetrically dependent on the core homonym. What makes the 
core cases be core, is that the definitions of all non-core cases must make reference to 
the core cases, whereas the reverse does not hold (viz. that the definitions of core cases 
must  make  reference  to  any  non-core  case).  Causal  relations  can  not  ground  this 
definitional priority of the core case in relation to the derived cases since, as we have 
seen, it is both causally prior and posterior relative to different non-core cases. Since 
CDH*  leaves  the  definitional  asymmetry  obtaining  between  derived  and  core 
homonyms unexplained, it is inadequate in its present form.
3.2 Definitional priority
CDH* is, as we have seen, successful in many ways. But since it fails to explicate in 
what  way  the  non-core  homonyms  are  asymmetrically  dependent  on  the  core 
homonyms,  it  needs  to be supplemented by an additional clause that will  make this 
clear.  Shields  suggests  that  the  derived  instances  of  homonyms are  asymmetrically 
dependent on the core instances because these have some kind of ‘primitive priority’ 
(1999, 126) over the derived instances. In what follows, we will explore this suggestion. 
As we have seen in the presentation of core-dependent homonymy in  Metaphysics  
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Gamma 2, Aristotle calls the core homonyms ἀρχαί (1003b6), what I have translated as 
‘sources’ throughout. Why Aristotle reckons the core homonyms as sources of the non-
core  or  derived  homonyms,  should  be  quite  obvious.  The  derived  instances  of 
homonyms are core-dependent because their accounts necessarily make appeal to the 
core instance, whereas the account of the core instance does not make appeal to any of 
the  derived instances.  But  what  it  is  that grounds this asymmetry,  is,  however,  less 
obvious. We have seen Shields arguing that it  cannot be the causal relations holding 
between the non-core and core instances, for there is no causal asymmetry between core 
and non-core cases: the causal direction can both go towards the core (as in ‘productive 
of  health’)  and  from the  core  (as  in  ‘indicative  of  health’).  However,  some kind of 
priority is clearly presumed for the core cases by Aristotle, and as Shields points out, it 
is  evidently  some  kind  of  definitional  priority  (1999,  123).  Having  screened  the 
different types of priority listed by Aristotle in the twelfth chapter of the  Categories, 
Shields decides that the kind of priority added en passant  by Aristotle after his initial 
four-part  list  (‘priority  in  time’,  ‘priority  with  respect  to  implication  of  existence’, 
‘priority in arrangement’ and ‘priority in value’, Categories, 14a26–b8) might very well 
be the notion of priority that he is after. This fifth type of priority is tentatively called 
‘priority in nature’ by Aristotle, and he describes it by telling that even among things 
that reciprocate with respect to implication of existence,73 one of them may nevertheless 
‘in some way [be] the cause of the other’s existence’ (τὸ αἴτιον ὁπωσοῦν θατέρῳ τοῦ 
εἶναι,  Categories,  14b12).  To  clarify  what  he  means  by  this  somewhat  opaque 
description, Aristotle tells us that even though some state of affairs, say Socrates’ being 
hung over, and the true proposition that Socrates is hung over reciprocate with respect to 
implication of existence, Socrates’ being hung over is nevertheless responsible for the 
proposition’s being true, while the converse does not  hold, that is,  the proposition’s 
being true is not responsible for Socrates’ being hung over.74 
What  makes  this  kind  of  priority  appealing  for  Shields  is  first  and  foremost  its 
asymmetrical nature. Of the other types of priority listed in this chapter, the second type 
is both relevant and also possess the wanted kind of asymmetry. So, on what criteria 
73 That is, that the existence of one is implied by the existence of the other, and vice versa. For things  
that  do not  reciprocate with respect  to  implication of  existence,  the  existence  of  one  implies  the 
existence of the other, while the converse does not hold. This is by the way the definition of Aristotle’s  
second type of priority: ‘[One thing is prior when it] does not reciprocate with respect to implication  
of existence’ (Categories, 14a29–30, my translation)
74 In more familiar philosophical  jargon: the state of affairs is responsible for the existence of the true 
proposition (or, to be slightly more precise: responsible for the truth of the proposition) by being its  
truthmaker. See Armstrong (2004) for a theory of truthmaking.
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does Shields choose among them? What makes the fifth type preferable over the second 
is that it is very unlikely that core and non-core homonyms will not reciprocate with 
respect to implication of existence. Even though it is not necessarily the case that a 
brownish  hue  to  the  skin  is  an  indication  of  health,  or  that  some particular  diet  is 
productive of health, there will nevertheless be things ‘filling the roles’, so to say, of 
being indicative of health and being productive of health. So the asymmetry in question 
cannot be based on a capacity for independent existence, for the core case will most 
likely depend on non-core cases for its existence. The fifth type of priority is therefore 
to  be  preferred  since  it  can provide  the  wanted  asymmetry  while  at  the  same time 
tolerating reciprocation with respect to implication of existence. 
When we now consider the relations between core and non-core instances of core-
dependent  homonyms  in  the  light  of  this  fifth  type  of  priority  enumerated  in  the 
Categories, ‘priority in nature’, we find that the core homonym ‘will be in a way the 
cause  of  the  existence  of  a  derived  homonym,  or  perhaps  more  broadly  will  be 
responsible  for  its  existence  (τὸ αἴτιον  ὁπωσοῦν  θατέρῳ τοῦ  εἶναι)’ (Shields,  1999, 
124). Having thus found a way of explicating the asymmetric relation between the core 
homonym and the derived ones, Shields suggests this further refinement and expansion 
of CDH*:
CDH**: a and b are homonymously F in a core-dependent way iff: (i) they have 
their  name in common, (ii) their  definitions do not completely overlap, (iii)  
necessarily, if a is a core instance of F-ness, then b’s being F stands in one of the 
four causal  relations to  a’s  being  F,  and (iv)  a’s  being  F  is  asymmetrically  
responsible for the existence of b’s being F.
With this additional clause, the above definition of core-dependent homonymy brings 
out  that  a  core  homonym qualifies  as  a  such by  being  responsible  for  the  derived 
homonym’s being  F:  ‘Its  being  F  is  […] derived from the source’s [i.e.  the core’s] 
character’ (Shields, 1999, 125). And the priority involved is such that the source can be 
responsible for the derived instances’ being F (in an asymmetrical way) even though the 
source and the derived instances reciprocate with respect to implication of existence. As 
Shields summarizes: ‘Here, then is a primitive form of priority, not reducible to any 
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other  form,  which Aristotle may intend in calling the core instances  ἀρχαί’75 (1999, 
125).  Respecting  the  constraints  laid  down  by  this  notion  of  priority  on  the  core 
homonyms,  in  what  sense  of  the  term,  then,  can a  core  homonym be said  to  be  a 
‘source’? An illumination of this question is what Shields turns to next. ‘Source’ is said 
in many ways according to Aristotle, but only a few of those sayings can reasonably be 
taken to fit the notion of priority that was used to explicate the relation between core 
and non-core homonyms above. Among those that seem ‘directly relevant’ (1999, 125), 
however,  Shields  singles out  being an ἀρχὴ in the sense of being ‘that  from which 
something can first  be known’ (Metaphysics,  1013a14–15),  of which a premise in a 
demonstration is the immediately given example. For, as Shields says, the ‘[p]remises 
are  the  sources  of  their  conclusion  in  the  sense  that  they  are  responsible  for  the 
existence of a proposition’s being a conclusion’ (Shields, 1999, 125). The asymmetrical 
relations  obtaining  between  core  and  derived  instances  of  homonyms  are  thus, 
according to Shields, directly analogous to the primitive entailment relations in virtue of 
which a conclusion is derived from its premises:
So too is the asymmetry in core-dependent  homonymy primitive:  the cores are  
sources because they are semantically and metaphysically super-ordinate to their 
derivations. A complexion is healthy because its being healthy is explicable in no 
other  way  than  in  its  standing  in  an  appropriate  relation  to  a  healthy  entity. 
(Shields, 1999, 126) 
To sum up the finale of Christopher Shields’ analysis of core-dependent homonymy, he 
has argued that the core homonym is a source in the sense of being asymmetrically 
responsible for the existence of the derived homonyms’ being Fs. This priority of the 
core instance, however, is primitive, and therefore not reducible to any other kind of 
priority. Accordingly, Shields does not give us any additional clues as to  how a core 
case, say health, is responsible for the existence of a regimen’s being healthy, except 
that it is similar to the way in which the premises in some argument are responsible for 
the existence of a proposition’s being a conclusion. 
75 I suppose that the reason why Shields calls this type of priority a primitive one, is just that it is not 
reducible to any of the other four kinds listed in the chapter from the Categories. Thus I think his idea 
is  merely that  they are all,  so to say, on the same level  and equally basic.  As we saw,  however, 
Aristotle tentatively suggested the epithet ‘natural priority’ for it, so I find it a bit strange that Shields 
does not employ that name. 
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There are a few rather surprising aspects to the way Shields explicates the asymmetry 
in the relations between core and non-core homonyms. These merit comment. When 
discussing the type of priority a core homonym possesses over a derived homonym, 
Shields is conspicuously negligent of the fact that his chosen type of priority, ‘priority in  
nature’,  could very well  have been characterised as a kind of causal  priority.  In the 
sentence  clarifying  this  kind  of  priority—‘being  asymmetrically  responsible  for  the 
existence  of...’—we  even  find  the  Greek  word  for  cause,  αἴτιον  (translated  as 
‘responsible’ by Shields), so that what Aristotle actually says is that among things that 
reciprocate with respect to implication of existence, one thing can nevertheless be prior 
in relation to the other by being the cause of its existence. But having already ruled out 
that  the  core  homonym could  be  causally  prior  to  the  derived  ones,  Shields  seems 
almost eager to cover up this possibility, and chooses rather to talk of it as a ‘primitive  
type of priority’ than to make any indications to the effect that priority in nature might 
possibly be some kind of causal priority. It is equally stunning that he, when talking 
about ‘directly relevant’ senses of being sources for core homonyms, directly opts for 
‘that from which something can first be known’ (1013a14–15), without even airing the 
possibility that a core homonym can be a source for derived homonyms by in some way 
being their cause, although he surely must know that Aristotle holds that all causes are 
sources  (πάντα  γὰρ  τὰ  αἴτια  ἀρχαί,  1013a17).  Since  Shields  believes  that  causal 
relations  between  instances  of  homonyms  is  what  makes  them  qualify  as  core-
dependent, it is surprising to find that he does not delve deeper into the possibility that 
the causal relations could also provide the explanation of the source-character of the 
cores, and consequently of the definitional asymmetry holding between core and non-
core instances. Also in this case I believe that his somewhat conspicuous evasion from 
considering the possibility that core instances qualify as sources by being causes is due 
to the fact that he thinks he has already ruled out the possibility of such a causal priority 
to the core. For, as we remember76, Shields does not believe that the priority of core 
homonyms  in  relation  to  the  derived ones  can  be  accounted  for  causally  since  the 
direction of the causality in the causal relations between them varies, so that it does not  
map the asymmetry that is supposed to hold between core and non-core homonyms.
In  the  next  section  I  will  briefly  revisit  what  I  deem to  be  Shields’ somewhat 
premature dismissal of causal priority as a possible explication of the asymmetry in the 
relation between core and non-core homonyms. I will also address some other problems 
pertaining to Shields causal analysis of core-dependent homonymy.
76 See footnote 61 and the discussion in the main text from which it springs.  
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4 Challenges to Shields’ analysis 
As we have seen, it is expected of a fully satisfactory explication of core-dependent 
homonymy  that  it  be  able  to  account  for  the  asymmetrical  dependence  of  derived 
homonyms on their core,77 that is, it must give some explanation for why the definitions 
of the non-core instances must make reference to the core instances, but not the other 
way around. In his analysis of core-dependent homonymy, we saw that Shields believes 
that  this  asymmetry  cannot  be  explained  by the  causal  relations  obtaining  between 
instances of homonyms, for the simple reason that the direction of the causality that 
connects  different homonymous instances can head both towards and from the core 
instance. For in Shields’ view, the thing from which the causality flows, so to speak, is 
regarded as causally prior. Let me explain this in some detail. A healthy person and a 
healthy  regimen  are  homonymously  healthy  in  a  core-dependent  way  because  the 
healthiness of the person and the healthiness of the regimen are causally connected. 
According to Shields,  the health of the regimen is in this case causally prior to the 
health  of  the  person  by  being  an  efficient  cause  of  the  latter.  The  direction  of  the 
causality goes from the healthy regimen towards the health of the person. In other cases, 
however,  the direction of the causality is  the reverse,  it  goes  from  the health  in the 
person—the core instance of health—towards derived instances, such as health in a skin 
colour. In this situation, the health of a person will be an efficient cause of the healthy 
skin colour, and by Shields criteria, causally prior to it. The health of a person will thus, 
relative to different derived instances of health, be both causally prior and posterior. But 
as we know, the health of a person—being the core instance of health—is supposed to 
be  prior  to  all  the  derived  instances  of  health  by  being  the  instance  to  which  the 
definitions of all the derived instances must make reference. So conclusively, since the 
core instance is not causally prior to the derived instances in every case, its priority in 
relation to them can therefore not be accounted for causally.
The causal relations that most obviously destroy the candidacy of causal priority in 
Shields’ picture, are efficient causal relations with directions towards the core instances, 
such as our example of a regimen producing health in a person. The regimen is in this 
77 See 2.2 for the requirements to specifications of R, the relation between core and non-core instances of 
a homonym. 
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situation the cause, and the resultant health, the effect. What is interesting, however, is 
that  all  the things  that  qualify as  efficients  in  such relations,  can also  be placed in 
another causal role. A regimen can certainly be an efficient cause of the health of a 
person, but the health of a person can likewise be said to be the final cause of the 
regimen, its goal and ‘that for the sake of which’ (τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα) it is followed, insofar as 
it is a healthy regimen. Accordingly, a healthy regimen can be seen as standing in both 
an efficient  and a final causal  relation to the health  of a person. And notice,  in the 
second of these relations, the causal priority matches the definitional priority, for in this 
case the direction of the causality heads from the core towards the non-core instance. So 
the things, or more properly activities, called healthy because they are efficient causes 
of health, could equally well be called healthy due to the fact that their final cause is 
health. And only in the first of these types of causal relations is the role of the activity 
(i.e. the regimen) such that it has causal priority. In the second, health, as final cause, 
has causal priority relative to the regimen, since the causal direction in this case goes 
from health towards the regimen. So the health of a person, the core instance of health, 
can—even on Shields’ criteria—be seen as causally prior to the  healthy regimen, and 
thus as a causal (!) source of the derived instance. This fact indicates something very 
interesting about the ways different types of causal relations are connected. I will get 
back to this in a moment, but before that I would like to make a comment on Shields’ 
criteria for causal priority.
As we have seen, Shields employs a notion of causal direction when deciding matters  
of causal priority: that from which the causal direction heads (in a causal relation), has 
causal  priority.  When illustrating this notion,  he exclusively makes use of examples 
involving efficient causality (1999, 113 and 122). And indeed, in these examples, the 
idea of causal direction does sound plausible: When a mountain hike produces health, 
the direction of the causality goes from it (i.e. the activity of tumbling around in the 
mountain), towards the health of the particular person, the end product. With respect to 
cases of final causation, however, it is not similarly natural to talk of a direction of the  
causality (viz. from the cause, the goal, to the caused instance, some specific activity). 
The  situation  is  similar  in  the  case  of  material  causation.  Also  here  talk  of  causal 
direction seems strange. Just consider the example given of muscles, arteries and blood 
constituting the material cause of an organism. I am not at all sure that it makes sense to 
talk of the causation being directed towards the organism in this case. So the very idea 
of a causal direction in the Aristotelian causal relations seems problematic. It seems too 
infused with movement and maybe even a temporal sense of before and after, and thus 
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having more to do with a notion of causality in terms of bumping and pushing and 
contiguity  in  time  and  space  than  to  anything  Aristotelian.  In  short,  talk  of  causal 
direction seems to be tied up in a spatio-kinematic imagery unfitting for at least three 
(and most probably all) of Aristotleʼs four causes, and should most likely be dismissed. 
Consequently,  causal  direction  does  not  seem  to  be  a  very  good  candidate  for 
determining something like causal priority. Be that as it may, I have no intent of giving 
any conclusive argument against  the idea of causal  direction here.  I  merely want to 
express  some  discomfort  with  the  notion,  along  with  some  rather  experimentally 
spirited suggestions. Leaving a discussion of causal direction to the side, let us instead 
take up the thread from the last paragraph and proceed with a completely different take 
on causal priority. 
4.1 Causal priority 2.0
I previously hinted to an interesting connection between types of causality. This was 
occasioned by the revelation of the dual causal roles performed by the very same items 
in final and efficient causal relations. As we discovered, the health of a person can for 
example be seen both as the effect of a mountain hike (viz. as the effect of an efficient 
cause), and as the final cause of the mountain hike. The thought that sprang to mind at 
this point was that if there exist relations of priority and posteriority among the causes,  
then this could possibly explain the asymmetry in the relations between core and non-
core  instances  of  homonyms.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  if  (i)  core  and  non-core 
instances of core-dependent homonyms inevitably stand in causal relations with respect 
to each other—as suggested by Shields’ analysis—, and (ii) all causal relations can be 
charted in a way that brings forth their connection to the primary cause (due to the 
interrelatedness of different causal relations, as was shown in the example of final and 
efficient causality), then (iii) the asymmetrical dependence of the derived instances on 
the core will be explicable in terms of a sort of causal priority, and the core instance will  
count as source in a causal sense, i.e. by being a cause. (This presupposes, of course, 
that the primary cause will actually prove identical to the core homonym in every case). 
So, are there any indications that Aristotle believes that causes are ordered according 
to priority? There are, and that in two very significant places. Both when introducing his 
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four-causal  explanatory  scheme  in  the  Physics, and  when  proclaiming  that  First 
Philosophy will  be preoccupied  with investigating  the  principal  causes we find him 
mentioning ‘the primary cause’ (τὴν πρώτην αἰτίαν). In the Physics he says: ‘[M]en do 
not think they know a thing till they have grasped the ‘why’ of it (which is to grasp its 
primary cause)’ (194b18–20). The statement in the Metaphysics reads similarly: ‘[F]or 
we say we know each thing only when we think we recognize its first cause’ (983a25–
26). A third place in the corpus, Parts of Animals I 1, provides further clarification of his 
view on priority among causes: 
[T]he causes concerned in natural generation are, as we see, more than one. There  
is the cause for the sake of which, and the cause whence the beginning of motion 
comes. Now we must decide which of these two causes comes first, which second 
(ποία πρώτη καὶ δευτέρα). Plainly, however, that cause is the first which we call 
that for the sake of which. For this is the account (λόγος) of the thing, and the  
account forms the starting-point (ἀρχὴ), alike in the works of art and in works of 
nature. (639b12–17)
So, the final cause (‘that for the sake of which’, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα) is prior to the efficient 
cause (‘the cause whence the beginning of motion’, τὴν ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως) , but 
what kind of priority does Aristotle have in mind here? The reason he gives in support  
of the priority of the final cause gives us a clue. The Oxford translation cited above, 
however,  risks leaving us without  a clue. So a little  preliminary clarification is  first 
needed.  Λόγος,  which  here  is  translated  with  ‘account’ is  best  rendered  ‘form’ or 
‘essence’ in  this context,  such that what  we actually  find in  the last  sentence is  an 
identification of final cause with form or essence.78 We are namely told that λόγος is a 
natural  principle  (ἀρχὴ  …  ἐν  τοῖς  φύσει  συνεστηκόσιν,  639b16–17),  and  being  a 
linguistic item, an account does not seem up to such a task. That being said, there will of  
course be an account corresponding to the form, an account that states what the form (or 
better: the thing that has the form) essentially is.79 Talk of a thing’s λόγος will thus be 
ambiguous in that it can either concern the account or real definition of the thing or the 
78 For another place where λόγος is identified with essence, see  Metaphysics  A, 993a17: ‘[T]his (i.e. 
λόγος) is the essence and the substance of the thing.’ And concerning the identity of form and essence, 
see Metaphysics Z, 1032b1: ‘By form I mean the essence of each thing.’
79 What I called real definition in 2.2.
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real correlate of the definition; the form or essence that is signified by it. This ambiguity 
is actually exploited by Aristotle in the passage immediately following the one cited 
above. Here he aims at clarifying what is meant by the claim that λόγος is a principle in 
both works of art and works of nature, and he does so by showing how it figures as a 
principle in the execution of a craft: 
 
[T]he doctor and the builder define health or house, either by the intellect or by 
perception, and then proceed to give the accounts and the causes of each of the 
things they do and of why they should do it thus. Now in the works of nature the 
good and that for the sake of which is still more dominant than in works of art. 
(639b17–21)
In order to being able to build a house, the craftsman will need to acquire for himself the 
account of a house. Banally put, he must learn what a house is. Gaining the possession 
of this account will involve, according to Aristotle’s theory of thinking, the realization 
of the form of the house in the soul of the craftsman. This is, however, not an ordinary 
realization of the form of the house—for this would mean that the soul would literally 
become a house when thinking of a house—, but rather a realization of the form without 
matter,  what  we have  called  an  encoding of  the  form in  the  soul.80 Only  when he 
possesses the account of a house  (viz. the form of the house is realized in his soul) can 
the craftsman go about planning the process leading to the realization of the house: what 
must be done, how it must be done, and in what order it must be done. The efficient  
causes, the ones that actually produce the house, are thus only explicable with reference 
to the house, the goal of the activity of housebuilding. That is, only with the goal in 
view, the house, can the craftsman determine the detailed route leading to the finished 
house.  Accordingly,  the  character  of  the  efficient  causes,  their  mode  of  being,  is 
dependent on the character of the final/formal cause, or as Alan Code puts it in a paper 
on the priority of final causes: ‘The reason why the changes have the character they do 
is that  that  is the character they need in order to bring about the result’ (1997, 136). 
Aristotle believes that cases of natural generation are exactly analogous to the described 
case  of  artistic  production,  and  thus  that  the  same  dependence  relations  between 
efficient and final/formal causality are found in natural generation as well.  The only 
80 For Aristotleʼs account of thinking, see De Anima, 429a13–17. The distinction between exemplifying 
and encoding a form is presented above in 3.1. 
61
difference is that in natural generation you have no deliberating agent executing his 
craft through meticulously calculated interventions on some external matter, but rather a 
form or goal inherent in the natural object regulating the processes and changes in it. 
And, he even adds, in natural generation the final cause’s reign over the efficient causes 
‘is still more dominant’ (639b21) than in artistic production.
From this discussion in the Parts of Animals it seems clear that the kind of priority 
that  Aristotle  wants  to  ascribe  to  final/formal  causes  is  that  which  in  the  list  in 
Metaphysics Delta 11 goes under the name ‘priority in nature and substance’ (1019a1–
4).81 For Aristotle says of things which are prior in this way that they can be what they 
are independently of other things being what they are, while the converse does not hold. 
This seems exactly to fit what we have said about the nature and the character of the 
efficient  causes  depending  in  their  being  on  the  final/formal  cause,  while  the 
final/formal  causes  does  not  depend  in  their  being  on  the  efficient  causes.  This 
dependence between the natures of the different causes corresponds to the asymmetrical 
dependence among their respective accounts:  The efficient causes are not explicable 
independently of the final/formal causes, whereas the final/formal causes can be stated 
without reference to the efficient causes.82    
We have seen that the final/formal cause is prior to the efficient cause. But what 
about the material causes? And does our identification of formal and final causes really 
have  legitimacy? To answer the last  question first.  The final  and formal  cause  will 
always coincide in natural things, so in these cases the identification is unproblematic.83 
With respect to artefacts, on the other hand, it appears that they in some respect go 
81 Cf. Generation of Animals II, 6, 742a19–21: ‘For there is a difference between the end or final cause 
and that which exists for the sake of it; the latter is prior in order of development, the former is prior in 
82 I am here committed to Michail M. Peramatzis’ account of priority in nature and substance in terms of  
‘priority in being what something is’ (2008, 189). Being influenced by Kit Fine’s paper ‘Ontological  
Dependence’ (1995), Peramatzis argues that the ontological independence of the primary thing must  
not  be  understood  in  terms  of  existential  independence  (viz.  ‘being  capable  of  independent 
existence’), but rather as an independence in being what it is, a kind of priority that correlates with 
definitional priority. As Fine says: ‘The notion of one object depending upon another is therefore the 
real counterpart to the nominal notion of one term being definable in terms of another’ (1995, 275). 
Although I will not here be able to carry out an extensive defence of this interpretation of Aristotle’s 
notion,  one  example  might  nevertheless  give  a  hint  of  its  superiority  over  the  ‘existential 
independence’-interpretation: Even though a form cannot exist independently of the type of matter or 
the composite which it en-forms, the form is nevertheless prior to the matter and the composite in that 
it makes the composite (i.e. the particular substance) be what it is, and not the other way around (cf. 
Metaphysics  Z, 1–6).  Priority in being what something is can account for this;  priority in existence  
cannot (cf. Peramatzis, 2008, 205–206).
83 Cf. Physics II, 7, 198b3–4: ‘... the essence of a thing, i.e. the form; for this is the end or that for the 
sake of which’ (τὸ τί ἐστιν καὶ ἡ μορφή· τέλος γὰρ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα).
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apart. It can namely be argued that ‘form’ should be understood as shape or arrangement 
in  these  cases.  The form and the  purpose,  i.e.  the  formal  and  the  final  cause,  will  
nevertheless be closely connected in these situations too. Being familiar with Aristotle’s 
commitment to the thesis of functional determination of kinds, this should not come as a 
surprise.84 For goals and purposes, which belongs to all functions, will delimit the range 
of possible shapes and arrangements of the things, so that the shape or arrangement of 
the object to a further or lesser extent will depend on the purpose it is made to serve, 
and thus will be bound up with the function and final cause of the object in question. 
This is really just to say that even though chairs can have different shapes and looks, 
there are shapes and looks and ways of being arranged that is not compatible with being 
a chair (viz. with performing the functions associated with being a chair). So in these 
cases, where a plain identification of formal and final causality seems unwarranted, the 
final cause appears to have priority over the formal cause. 
Let us now turn to the second question, about the possible posteriority of the material 
cause in relation to the final/formal  cause:  Matter in Aristotelian philosophy is  best 
understood  as  proximate  matter,  that  is,  as  functional  material  for  some  particular 
substance: the material parts that contributes to the functionality of the substance. Any 
specifiable  matter  such as  blood,  bones,  and organs  will  thus  be  en-formed matter, 
matter which depends for its identity and character on the form with which it jointly 
compose a substance. What the matter in some particular instance is, is consequently 
only specifiable with reference to the substance whose matter it is. Since the form is 
what makes the substance be what it is, the form clearly has definitional priority over 
matter. And as we have seen, this priority in definition is correlated with priority in 
nature  and  substance.  From  this  somewhat  crude  summary  of  Aristotelian 
hylomorphism, we can conclude that the final/formal  causes are prior in nature and 
substance to material causes.85 
Having seen that Aristotle  holds  that  final/formal  causes  are  prior  (in  nature and 
substance) to efficient and material causes, it seems that we have found another way of 
explicating the asymmetrical dependence between non-core and core homonyms than 
the  way proposed by Shields (viz.  in  terms of  a ‘primitive  priority’).  For,  since  all  
causes  depend  in  being  what  they  are  on  the  final/formal  cause,  the  aspect  of 
84 See 2.4, where this is introduced.
85 Aristotleʼs functional determination thesis (FD) reflects this commitment to the priority of form over 
matter in that it states that the matter of man (i.e. body parts such as eyes, fingers, legs etc.) will not  
really qualify as such (i.e. as the matter of man) if it cannot perform the functions associated with 
different body parts (cf. De Anima, 412b10–15). For more on FD, see 2.4. 
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asymmetrical  dependence  in  the  (causal)  relations  between  core  and  non-core 
homonyms  is  accounted  for.  That  is,  the  final/formal  cause’s  priority  in  nature  and 
substance  in  relation  to  efficient  and material  causes  can account  for  the  aspect  of 
asymmetry in the relation between core and derived homonyms, provided that the core 
homonym would actually prove to represent the final cause in the causal relations it has 
to the derived cases. And if we have a quick look at Aristotleʼs favourite illustrations of 
core-dependent homonyms, this seems to be the case. For among all the healthy things, 
the healthy person seems to be the goal to which all the other healthy things must be 
appropriately casually related in order to qualify as healthy. And likewise with all the 
medical things: The art of medicine seems to be the goal to which all the other medical 
things  must be appropriately causally related for them to qualify as medical. 
We have now demonstrated that a notion of causal priority, pace Shields, can explain 
the asymmetric dependence of the derived cases on the core. It is, however, a different  
notion of causal priority than the one discussed by Shields. In the preferred sense of 
‘causally prior’, a cause is prior with respect to another cause if it  can be what it is  
independently  of the other causes being what  they  are,  but  not  conversely.86 In  this 
understanding of causal priority, the core homonym will consequently count as an ἀρχὴ 
by  being  the  causal  source  of  the  derived  cases.  This  is  something  that  is  vastly 
preferable  over  the  suggestion  that  a  core  homonym  is  an  ἀρχὴ  by  possessing  an 
(inexplicable) primitive priority. 
I  will  not at  this point  venture into a  detailed defence of this  alternative  way of 
explicating  the  priority  and source-character  of  the  core  in  relation to  the  non-core 
homonyms.  Neither  will  I  consider  what  results  we  will  actually  get  if  apply  the 
established criteria  for  core-dependency (CDH**)  on Aristotle’s  own candidates  for 
core-dependent homonymy. That is, I will not enter a discussion about which candidates 
will pass as core-dependent homonyms, and which will not.87 What I will do, however, 
is  to  briefly  consider  the  very  tenability  of  a  causal  analysis  of  core-dependent 
homonymy. For in some cases of core-dependent homonymy, the relations between the 
core and the derived instances do not immediately seem specifiable in causal terms. The 
cases I specifically have in mind is homonyms ordered in so-called priority series (P-
series). My presentation of these homonyms will be based on A. C. Lloyd’s work on P-
86 Shields account  of  causal  priority,  on the other  hand,  states  that  among things or  events that  are 
causally related, that thing or event from which the causal direction heads, is causally prior. As we 
have seen, it is, according to Shields, the account’s appeal to causal direction that makes it unfit to  
explain the definitional priority of the core homonym. 
87 For such discussions see Shields (1999), Lewis (2004) and Ward (2008). 
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series, but my treatment of his work will be selective as I will focus only on the aspects 
of his analysis that is directly relevant to the broader discussion of this thesis. 
If we in our investigation into yet other types of homonymy find that there are core-
dependent homonyms whose interrelations resist causal specification, the generality of 
Shields’ account would be threatened. If the generality gets lost, and it is revealed that 
only some relations between core and non-core homonyms can be causally specified, 
doubts should be had about whether an analysis of the relations between core and non-
core homonyms in causal  terms is really  what gets  at  the heart  of the matter in the 
relation between them. 
4.2 Priority series 
For objects that have an order of priority, Aristotle holds that their common predicate or 
universal is not something apart  from them. I will  in the following refer to such an 
ordering of objects as P-series (after Lloyd, 1962), and will take the liberty to switch 
between talk of the objects and terms (that designate the objects) when talking about the 
items in the series. In the paper ‘Genus, Species and Ordered Series in Aristotle’ (1961), 
A. C. Lloyd identifies two things that Aristotle could mean by denying that the universal  
or common predicate of a P-series is παρὰ τὰ εἴδη. Firstly, he could mean to deny that it  
is one of the secondary substances of the Categories; a separate, substantial universal. 
Lloyd coins this  the  metaphysical  thesis.  Secondly,  he could  mean to deny that the 
universal  is  logically  related  to  series  terms  as  genus  to  species,  that  is,  that  the 
universal is predicated essentially and synonymously of the terms. Lloyd coins this the 
logical thesis (1962, 68).88 Lloyd shows persuasively that Aristotle, in claiming that the 
common predicate  of  a  P-series  is  not  παρὰ τὰ εἴδη,  in  various places  in  his  work 
intends to express both the metaphysical and the logical thesis. For people familiar with 
Aristotelian  philosophy,  it  is  of  course  no  surprise  that  Aristotle  submits  to  the 
metaphysical thesis. But it is worth mentioning in this connection that even Platonist 
philosophers  hold  this  thesis  with  regard  to  the  universal  of  a  P-series.  As  Lloyd 
explains it:
88 Since a thesis about the non-synonymy of the common predicate of things in P-series will also be a 
thesis about the differing natures of the things in the  series (cf.  Aristotleʼs view on signification, 
presented in 2.2), the name ‘logical thesis’ is a bit misleading and actually conceals the fact that the 
thesis is concerned with more than mere logic.  
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In such a series one of the terms is first in the order of priority (for example, the 
double  in  a  series  of  multiples);  but  if  there  where  a  separate  Idea  (say,  
multiplicity) which embraced this series it would be prior to all the terms, so that 
what had ex hypothesi been first would no longer be first. (Lloyd, 1962, 70)
It is because the Idea, according to the theory of Ideas, would have to rank as on of the 
terms  of  the  series,  that  the  Platonists  is  forced  to  hold  that  there  is  no  Idea 
corresponding to the universal of the p-series (for example no Idea of number apart 
from the Idea of two, three, four etc.)89 (Lloyd, 1962, 70). This, however, is not yet to 
refute a logical genus of a P-series. So the Platonists need not ascribe to the logical 
thesis. But, as we shall see, Aristotle ascribes to it. That this is something of interest in 
the context of this thesis should be clear from the fact that a denial of a synonymous 
common term for the P-series in effect implies the assertion that the common term of 
the P-series is predicated homonymously of the objects in the series.90 It is accordingly 
the logical thesis that will occupy us in the following.  
Let us now, with Lloyd, consider two of the most famous places where Aristotle is 
clearly expressing the logical thesis. The first is in the Politics III, 1. After having given 
a provisional definition of the state (πολίτης) Aristotle proceeds by saying:
But  it  must  be  remembered  that  when  we  are  talking  of  things  which  differ 
specifically,  but  one  of  which  is  first,  another  second  and  the  next  third,  the 
universal  predicate  (τὸ  κοινόν)  of  the  class  is  either  non-existent  (τὸ  παράπαν 
οὐδέν) or virtually so. (1275a35–37, Lloyd’s translation) 
Arguing  that  states  (πολίτειαι)  form  such  a  class,  Aristotle  uses  this  to  draw  his 
somewhat famous conclusion that the citizen is necessarily something different (ἔτερον) 
89 Two is the first number (ἀριθμός) for the Greeks. One is understood as unity (μονάς), and is regarded 
90 Before we proceed, though, I will like to make a note of clarification. Although all things ordered  
according to priority would seem to constitute P-series on the criteria given by Lloyd above, inclusive 
e.g. healthy things, what he has in mind when using this designation is something more restricted. For 
the things he talks about as ordered in P-series, such as numbers, figures, souls, states etc., appear to 
have their essential predicate in common (and not just an accidental, one such as ‘healthy’). In what  
follows I will  
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in different kinds of states.91 The second place where he clearly expresses the logical 
thesis is in the De Anima II, 3: 
Soul would have a single definition in the same way as figure: there is not figure 
apart from (παρά) the triangle and its successors and there is not  soul apart from 
the ones  that  have been  mentioned.  One  could  have a  definition  predicable  of 
figures in general (λόγος κοινός): but while it will apply to all figures it will be  
definitory (ἴδιος) of no figure. Similarly in the case of the kinds of soul that have  
been mentioned. (414b20-25, Lloyd’s translation). 
What Aristotle claims with respect to the objects in P-series is that there is not some one 
common nature that is predicable of them all, as in the case of ordinary genus-species 
classification. For in contrast to biological species where the same animality figures in 
the essence of both wolf and man, there is no one soul-nature present in the nutritive, 
perceptual or rational souls, or one figure-nature present in triangles, quadrangles, and 
pentagons.  Soul-nature  is  immediately  differentiated  into  the  nature  of  nutritive, 
perceptive and rational soul respectively, and similarly with figure-nature.  As Lloyd 
(referring  Simplicius)  says:  ‘The  generic  universal  does  not  remain  constant 
(ἀποράλλακτος)  but  is  differentiated  in  the  species  (καθ᾽  ἕκαστον  διαφορούμενον)’ 
(1962, 79).  Also commenting on the logical  thesis,  Steven Strange writes:  ‘In some 
sense there is a universal, but it differs in account in its application to the successive 
terms of the series, hence it cannot be a genus’ (1987, 967). Strange continues with a 
nice illumination of the claim in the logical thesis by elaborating on Aristotle’s example 
of figures:
There cannot be a definition of ‘rectilinear figure’ in general which is not identical 
with the definition of any of its subtypes, as the definition of a genus must be: e.g.,  
‘surface bounded by lines’ is incomplete; it means, ‘surface bounded by n lines’ for 
some value of n, which is the definition of one of its species and therefore cannot  
be the definition of the genus. The same is true in the case of soul, according to  
Aristotle. (1987, 967) 
91 The reasoning here is as follows: What it is to be a part depends on the whole of which it is a part, and  
since citizens are parts of states, what it is to be a citizen will inevitably vary in different kinds of  
states. 
67
Even though ‘soul’ and ‘figure’ designate species, that is, some type of soul are some 
type of figure, this is not to say that they cannot behave like genus terms, for they do.  
All the terms of a P-series (that have successors) are namely necessarily predicable of 
their  successors.92 This  is  because  the  terms  in  a  P-series  ‘potentially  contains  its 
predecessors’ (De Anima,  414b31).  So, for example,  ‘nutritive soul’ is  predicable of 
both sensible and rational soul, and the reason for this seems to be that the primary 
thing, nutritive soul, enters into the composition of the posterior thing, sensible soul, 
and that it is in this way that they are ‘potentially contained’ in them. The following 
passage might clarify what Aristotle means:
For the power of perception is never found apart from the power of self-nutrition, 
while–in plants–the latter is found isolated from the former ... Again, among living 
things that possess sense some have the power of locomotion, some not. Lastly, 
certain  living  beings—a  small  minority—possess  calculation  and  thought,  for 
(among mortal beings) those which possess calculation have all the powers above 
mentioned, while the converse does not hold—indeed some live by imagination 
alone, while others have not even imagination. (De Anima, 415a1–12)
In the light of his own examples and illustrations, it seems clear that Aristotle thinks that  
the priority involved in P-series is some kind of ontological priority. There are quite a 
few ways to understand ontological priority, but the one immediately suggesting itself, 
is  one  in  terms of  existential  dependence.  In  the  cited  passage  from  De Anima  the 
import of what Aristotle says seems to be that the nutritive soul is prior to both sensitive 
and rational soul by being capable of existing independently of the latter two, whereas 
they  cannot  exist  without  nutritive  soul.93 In  addition  to  being  in  some  sense 
ontologically  prior  to  the  other  types  of  soul,  the  nutritive  soul  seems  to  be 
definitionally  prior  to  them.  When  looking  at  the  accounts  of  such  activities  as 
perceiving, thinking, imagining etc. in the second and third book of De Anima, one finds 
that the account of sensation makes reference to nutrition, and the account of thinking 
makes reference to sensation. If thinking cannot be accounted for or defined without 
reference to sensation—for example in that thought, or at least the content of thought 
92 So the last term of a P-series is the only one that does not behave like a genus.
93 Strictly speaking, the rational soul depends on the sensitive soul. But since the ‘depends on’-relation is  
transitive, the rational soul will depend on the nutritive soul as well. 
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depends on sensation—, than sensation is definitionally prior to thinking. As we have 
seen  earlier,  there  is  a  distinct  type  of  ontological  priority,  ‘priority  in  being  what 
something is,’94 that can reasonably be described as the ontological correlate to such 
definitional priority. So maybe the priority relations between the items in the P-series 
are  best  captured by this  notion of ontological  priority? Compared to the  notion of 
ontological priority in terms of existential dependence, it does at least seem to have one 
advantage. For if one accounts for the priority of the nutritive soul in relation to the 
other souls in terms of existential independence, one seems forced to accept that along 
with every  rational  soul,  there exist  both  a  nutritive  and a  sensitive  soul,  since  the 
former  ‘depends  for  its  existence’ on  the  latter  two.  This  is  truly  an  unfortunate 
outcome, and the alternative, that rational soul depends in being what it is on the being 
(but not the existence) of sensitive soul, therefore seems preferable.  
When regarding Aristotle’s other main example of things ordered in P-series, namely 
figures,  a notion of ontological priority seems also here to be successful in explaining 
the way in which the primary object/s  is/are potentially  contained in  the successive 
objects. In this case, however, the notion of ontological priority in terms of existential 
dependence seems to be the most appropriate. According to Aristotle, every polygon is 
composed out of (and can be decomposed into) triangles. One can thus say that for any 
polygon, it depends for its existence on n number of triangles. —Remove a triangle 
from the  figure,  and  the  original  figure  will  be  destroyed.  The  kind  of  ontological 
priority enjoyed by the triangle in relation to the other polygons does not seem to be 
reflected on the definitional level however. Even though other polygons probable can be 
defined in terms of triangles,  it  does not seem plausible that  they  must.  It  therefore 
seems  perfectly  possible  for  any given  polygon to  be  defined without  reference  to 
triangle.
Aristotleʼs third example of objects that are ordered in P-series, states (πολίτειαι), 
deviates  in  important  respects  from  the  other  two  examples,  and  prove  much  less 
interesting in reference to this discussion. In the P-series of states there are only two 
items, one prior and the other posterior, and their ordering is determined by the one 
being in a perfect condition (i.e. the primary object), and the other being in a ‘faulty or 
perverted’ condition (i.e. the posterior object) (Politics, 1275b1). In P-series of states it 
is not the case that the primary object is potentially contained in the posterior, that is, 
the prior item does not enter into the composition of the successive items in this P-series 
94 Peramatzis (2008, 189). ‘Priority in being what something is’ is his interpretation of priority in nature 
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as it does in the P-series of souls and figures. Additionally, the priority involved in this 
series is of another kind than in the other examples. Even though it is not very cleary  
stated, it seems that Aristotle holds that one state is prior to the other by being of greater 
value. However that may be, I will not dwell on this particular type of P-series any 
longer, for as I said, it is of minor importance relative to our purposes.
Having now gained a decent overview of the general characteristics of homonyms in P-
series, what underwrites the homonymy, and how the different homonyms are related to 
each other,  we can now turn  to  the  announced examination  of  whether  Christopher 
Shields’ proposed causal analysis of core-dependent homonymy will prove appropriate 
for such a clear case of core-dependent homonymy as ‘soul’. 
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5 Conclusion
In our discussion of the P-series of souls above, we saw that the different souls qualifies 
as homonyms because each type of soul, that is nutritive, sensitive and rational, has 
their own definition. The definitions are not completely distinct, however, so they are 
not discrete homonyms. When definitions are not discrete, they overlap, and this is just 
what  we find  with  respect  to  the  definitions  of  souls.  But  it  is  more  to  say  of  the 
overlaps  among  the  definitions  than  that  they  overlap,  for  the  definitions  overlap 
systematically: The account of being for any given soul (except, of course, the primary 
soul) must necessarily make reference to the account of being for the soul immediately 
prior to it in the series, so that all souls ultimately make reference to the account of 
being for the primary soul. All this should clearly indicate that ‘soul’ is a good candidate 
for being core-dependently homonymous, if anything is. There is, however, one crucial 
condition it must satisfy. Christopher Shields criteria for core-dependent homonymy, as 
specified in CDH**, states that all non-core instances of a homonym must stand in one 
of the four causal relations to the core homonym. Sensitive and rational soul must thus 
stand in one of the four causal relations to nutritive soul in order to qualify as core-
dependent homonyms. So, do they? Both efficient and final causal relations seem easily 
ruled out, and when remembering the dubious credentials of formal causation, we are 
left merely with material causation. But is that so bad? The presentation of the logical 
thesis about P-series above we shows that all the terms in a P-series except for the last 
in  some  way  behaved  like  a  genus  by  being  predicable  of  all  their  successive 
terms/objects. Additionally, there are several places where Aristotle identifies genus and 
matter,95 couldn’t  it  therefore  be  that  the  prior  objects  enters  into  the  posterior  as 
material parts? The core instance of the homonym, the nutritive soul, would then count 
as a material cause of the posterior objects, and they will be connected by a material 
causal  relation, and, voilà!,  qualify as core-dependent  homonyms. But unfortunately, 
this cannot be. For, as far as I can see, sight is not a material/functional part96 of the 
rational  soul,  it  is  rather a  formal part  of  the rational  soul,  a part  of  its  nature  (cf. 
Metaphysics Zeta 10). And when it ‘enters into the composition of the posterior’ (Lloyd, 
1962, 83), it does this not as a material part, but rather as a formal part. 
If  the  reasoning in  the  last  paragraph holds  good,  then the  homonymy of  ‘soul’ 
95 Cf. Grene (1974)
96 Although the sense organ of course is. 
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constitutes a counterexample to Christopher Shields’ proposal of a causal specification 
of R, the relation all non-core instances of a homonym bear to the core homonym. So, if 
we are forced to reject Shields’ promising attempt at a specification of the way core and 
non-core homonyms are related, are we left where we started? No. It has been noted 
several times in the course of this thesis that a notion of priority in nature and substance 
might  be  able  to  take  on  the  job  that  Shields  assigned  to  FCCP (four-causal  core 
primacy),  the job of sufficiently specifying the relations  between core and non-core 
homonyms.  
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